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AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED
JUSTIFICATION FOR FEDERAL
INTERVENTION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS*
INTRODUCTION
Until 1970, the federal government’s involvement in environ-
mental regulation was extremely limited; the primary responsibility
for dealing with environmental problems was entrusted not to the
federal government, but rather to the states.1 To the extent that the
federal government enacted environmental regulations prior to 1970,
“the primary targets . . . were federal agencies rather than private in-
dustry.”2 The federalization of environmental law began in earnest
when President Nixon’s signing of the National Environmental Policy
Act3 was nationally televised on January 1, 1970.4 Between 1970 and
1980, the federal government enacted no less than ten major envi-
* Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP; B.A. 1998, Wake Forest University; J.D.
2002, New York University School of Law. I am especially indebted to Dean Richard Revesz of
the New York University School of Law for his extensive comments and help in formulating the
argument. I am also grateful for the comments of Eric Biber, Robin Effron, Roger Craig Green,
Amy Powell, Brian S. Prestes and Robert Shaw.
1. See, e.g., Christopher K. Leman & Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federal-
ism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 1021 (1982).
2. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1158 (1995). One example of a pre-1970 regulation that targeted
federal agencies instead of private industry is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
(NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994). For more on the NHPA, see, e.g., Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Re-
sponsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a National Art Preservation Stat-
ute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 198-99 (2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1994). For more on the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), see infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
4. See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the
National Environmental Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
245, 245 (2000); Robert V. Percival, Separation of Powers, the Presidency and the Environment,
21 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 25, 33-34 (2001).
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ronmental regulatory schemes.5 However, beginning in the early
1990s, the major rationales for federal intervention have been reex-
amined in the academic literature.
Prominent economic justifications for federal intervention, such
as the race-to-the-bottom and public choice accounts, have been
questioned.6 Similarly, although the existence of interstate external-
ities provides a compelling case for federal intervention,7 the regula-
tory regime has been challenged as inconsistent with this justifica-
tion.8 In response to these critiques, proponents of a strong federal
regulatory role have advocated a number of other reasons for federal
intervention in addition to these three traditional justifications. Like
the three traditional justifications, most of these newer reasons are
economic in nature. For example, some scholars have argued that
centralized regulation has strong economies of scale advantages. By
“centralizing research, standard setting, control-measure selection,
implementation, or enforcement,” the federal government “can ab-
sorb these costs so that states do not have to repetitively perform
these functions.”9 Another economic justification is rooted in uni-
formity concerns: Federal regulation may benefit a manufacturer who
relies on economies of scale in the production process because some
federal environmental standards—such as those for pesticides and
mobile sources—serve both as regulatory floors and ceilings, thus al-
5. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 105-07 (3d ed. 2000) (providing a chronology of significant federal environmental
legislation).
6. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to
the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
For a synopsis of the debate surrounding the race-to-the-bottom rationale, see Richard L. Re-
vesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV.
553, 556 n.2 (2001). For a critique of the public choice rationale, see id.
7. The interstate externalities rationale provides a compelling case for federal interven-
tion in situations where one state realizes all the benefits of a pollution-generating activity but
does not bear the entirety of the costs. Such is often the case for air pollution. Richard L. Re-
vesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82
MINN. L. REV. 535, 540 (1997).
8. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2341 (1996).
9. Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National Perspective)
for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 251 (1997); see also,
e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 366-69
(2000); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 153-54 (2001). But see Revesz, supra note 7, at 543-44 (arguing that, although the
economies-of-scale argument is plausible in the early regulatory stages, such as the determina-
tion of environmental risks, it is "far less compelling at the standard-setting phase").
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lowing for standardization.10 In addition to these economic justifica-
tions, proponents of federal regulation have advanced a non-
economic justification, which I shall refer to as the “rights-based justi-
fication” for federal intervention.
The rights-based justification holds that the federal government
is obligated to control pollution levels because its citizens possess cer-
tain environmental rights. Commentators have advanced at least four
distinct reasons for vesting environmental rights in U.S. citizens.11 The
first reason is that individuals possess a right to bodily integrity that is
violated by high levels of environmental pollution. The second reason
is that all citizens possess the right to live in, and to enjoy, a clean en-
vironment. A third rationale is distributional in nature. Some com-
mentators, pointing to studies that conclude that poor people and ra-
cial minorities are exposed to disproportionate levels of
environmental risk, argue that the federal government should inter-
vene to combat “environmental racism.”12 A final argument underly-
ing the rights-based justification focuses on the potentially cata-
strophic impacts of elevated pollution levels. Some authors argue that
the great risks that environmental contamination poses to the planet
and to future generations justifies federal intervention.
The rights-based justification’s proponents utilize the justifica-
tion in two ways. First, they use the justification as a reason to oppose
devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to the
states.13 Second, they proffer the justification as a reason for the fed-
eral government to implement additional regulations.
10. Sarnoff, supra note 9, at 252-53 ("Federal uniform requirements that preempt the field
and thus exclude state and local regulation may protect interstate commerce from burdensome
and diverse controls . . . .").
11. For a more extensive explanation of these rationales, see infra Part I.
12. One commentator has noted that "[t]he terms 'environmental justice,' 'environmental
racism,' and 'environmental equity' are viewed as having different nuances and origins." Marc
R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut
and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 722 n.8 (1996).
Commentators often carefully select which term they will employ. See, e.g., id.; see also LUKE
W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE
RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 15-16 (2001); Colin Crawford, Strategies
for Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV.
267, 268 n.1 (1994); Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice/Racism/Equity: Can We Talk?, 96 W.
VA. L. REV. 1083, 1083 n.1 (1994). In this context, the term "environmental racism" is appropri-
ate because that is the precise charge that has been leveled upon the states. See infra note 88
and accompanying text.
13. For current concerns about potential rollbacks of federal regulatory responsibility fol-
lowing the Republicans' 2002 midterm victory, see, e.g., Mike Allen, Bush to Shorten Forest En-
vironmental Reviews, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2002, at A1 (noting that some commentators be-
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Various kinds of criticism may be directed at the rights-based jus-
tification. For example, it may be objected that, insofar as the envi-
ronmental rights being advocated can be linked to the public health,
“it is difficult to understand why the federal government should have
such a preeminent role in environmental regulation when it does rela-
tively little with respect to the provision of general health care.”14
Moreover, there is no objective standard by which we can determine
how much pollution constitutes “too much.” Rather, policy judgments
are inherently involved in determining the level of pollution beyond
which rights will be violated. Perhaps it is preferable for the states—
rather than the federal government—to themselves weigh the value
of an additional unit of environmental quality against the resulting re-
duction in revenue.15
This Article does not attempt to answer these questions about
the rights-based justification’s inherent validity; indeed, a detailed ex-
amination and evaluation of the justification itself is beyond the scope
of the Article. Rather, for the purposes of this Article, I assume that
the justification is plausible. I argue that, even if the rights-based jus-
tification is seen as a compelling reason for federal intervention, it fits
poorly with the present regulatory system. The federal government’s
current approach to environmental regulation is both overinclusive
and underinclusive with respect to the rights-based justification. The
regulatory system is overinclusive because federal regulations apply
even in areas where aggregate pollution levels are low enough that
citizens’ environmental rights are not violated. The regulatory system
is simultaneously underinclusive because it does not guarantee any
minimal level of environmental quality. Instead of directly controlling
environmental risk levels to which citizens or communities may be
exposed, “[r]egulation typically proceeds medium-by-medium, pol-
lieve that the Bush administration's plans to streamline the environmental review process be-
fore allowing logging on national forests "is a harbinger of rollbacks of environmental regula-
tions to come next year, when Republicans will control the Senate as well as the House"); Edi-
torial, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 3, 2002, at 12A (opining that, "[j]ust weeks after the midterm
election, it has become painfully apparent that this administration intends to reverse decades of
environmental regulation and progress"); Marc Sandalow, Pelosi Plays House Role Against
Stacked Deck; Accomplishing Demo Agenda Seen as Next to Impossible, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 14,
2003, at A3 (noting Republican plans to "limit environmental regulations").
14. Revesz, supra note 7, at 545.
15. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdic-
tions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); see also Re-
vesz, supra note 7, at 539 ("[C]ompetitive jurisdictions will set an environmental standard that is
defined by equating the willingness to pay for an additional unit of environmental quality with
the corresponding change in wages.").
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lutant-by-pollutant, statute-by-statute, and industry-by-industry.”16
This method of regulation is simply incapable of preventing high
pollution levels, particularly where a number of different pollutants in
various media emanate from multiple industries. Even if no federal
environmental standards are violated within a given community, citi-
zens—as well as the areas where they live, work and play—may be
exposed to inordinately high levels of environmental pollution.
Because of these problems with the right-based justification’s fit
to the regulatory system, the justification’s proponents should be cir-
cumspect in their use of the justification. When the justification is
proffered as a reason for responsibility for an existing federal regula-
tion should not be transferred to the states, or a reason that the fed-
eral government should enact an additional regulation, the regula-
tion’s costs should be carefully considered in light of the poor fit
between the justification and the regulatory system. Regulations
naturally impose compliance costs upon the regulated parties and im-
pose administrative costs upon the government,17 and these costs are
magnified when the regulations shift what seem to be localized policy
decisions from the states to the federal government.18 Moreover,
regulatory benefits—insofar as the justification is concerned—may be
greatly overestimated when the regulation in question is unable to ef-
fectively protect citizens’ environmental rights.
Given the costs of regulation and the fact that the regulatory sys-
tem’s underinclusiveness diminishes the rights-based benefits that it
produces, it is necessary to ask whether there is a method of safe-
guarding citizens’ environmental rights that is superior to the present
medium-by-medium, pollutant-by-pollutant and industry-by-industry
regulatory system. To be clearly superior to the present system, such
an alternative would have to guarantee citizens’ environmental rights
at least as well as the status quo, and also, in contrast to the present
system’s sweeping overinclusiveness, would have to be tailored spe-
cifically to the task of protecting citizens’ environmental rights. This
view accords with the European Community’s principle of propor-
tionality in environmental protection, which requires “that a measure
be reasonable and suitable, the least restrictive possible, and not dis-
16. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Perform-
ance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 266 (2001).
17. See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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proportionate or excessive.”19 Such a superior alternative exists, in the
form of flexible, cost-effective direct regulation of the cumulative lev-
els of environmental risk to which citizens and communities can be
exposed.20 Thus, after I explain the poor fit between the rights-based
justification and the regulatory status quo,21 I discuss how such a layer
of flexible, cost-effective direct regulation could be implemented.22
I.  THE RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATION
A number of commentators have contended that the protection
of citizens’ environmental rights is a sound reason for a strong federal
regulatory role.23 For example, one scholar argues that when a state
fails to provide a minimum level of environmental protection, its citi-
zens have a legitimate grievance against the federal government be-
cause “Americans, as citizens of a unified nation, have rights and ex-
pectations that transcend the capacity and limitations of their state
and local jurisdictions.”24
19. Juliane Kokott, Book Review, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 269, 269 (1999) (reviewing ANDREAS
R. ZIEGLER, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1996) and
DAMIEN GERADIN, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EC AND
US LAW (1997)).
Along with the principle of proportionality, the European Community also employs the
principle of subsidiarity, which is incorporated into the EC Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.
Consolidated version of the treaty establishing the European Community, art. 5, O.J. C 340/3, at
44 (1997).
20. I do not actually advocate these reforms, as this Article takes no position on whether
the rights-based justification is indeed a compelling reason for federal intervention. See supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text. Rather, my goal is to critically examine the implications of
the justification.
21. See infra Parts II and III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. E.g., James Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12
ENVTL. L. 863, 890 (1982) ("A pollution level that is detrimental to human health in one part of
the country will be detrimental to human health in all parts of the country. . . . [F]ederal gov-
ernment action to protect individuals against coercion by pollution is the best way to guarantee
the liberty of all individuals."); Steinzor, supra note 9, at 366-74; see also Robert Bejesky, An
Analytical Appraisal of Public Choice Value Shifts in Environmental Protection in the United
States & Mexico, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 267 (2001) ("The federal government be-
came comprehensively involved in environmental regulation and protection shortly after the
1960s Rights Revolution since this was not only a period of additional government expansion but
was also known for extending new substantive and procedural rights.").
24. Steinzor, supra note 9, at 370.
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Other commentators have argued that the Constitution itself
provides citizens with environmental rights. Some scholars contend
that high pollution levels violate an individual’s right to bodily integ-
rity,25 while others claim that U.S. citizens have a constitutional right
to enjoy a clean environment.26 Although courts have repeatedly re-
jected the contention that the Constitution provides citizens with en-
vironmental rights,27 the arguments supporting the constitutional
claim also provide policy support for the rights-based justification. In
fact, these arguments are likely stronger when removed from the legal
context, since “[l]aw is essentially formalistic, and morality is not in
the slightest degree formalistic.”28 While the legal arguments for envi-
ronmental rights may not satisfy the Constitution’s formal require-
ments, they may constitute a compelling moral case.
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971) ("While a growing number of
commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the environment, this newly-
advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been accorded judicial sanction; and appellants do
not present a convincing case for doing so."); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp.
1061, 1064-65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 536 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) ("Although there has been something of a boom recently in what Judge Seals of this
Court has described as 'grandiose claims of the right of the general populace to enjoy a decent
environment', such claims 'have been more successful in theory than in operation.'") (citations
omitted); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (E.D.
Ark. 1971) (mem.) ("[T]he Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not stated facts which would
under the present state of the law constitute a violation of their constitutional rights . . . .");
Envtl. Def. Fund Inc. v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,794 (D.
Mont. 1970); see also Fed. Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp.
181, 183-85 (D.D.C. 1978) (rejecting the right to a clean environment in the environmental to-
bacco smoke context). For a synopsis of these cases, see Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to
Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 107, 112-17 (1997). For a discussion of why courts have rejected these claims, see
infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
In light of the courts' repeated rejection of the argument that citizens possess a constitu-
tional right to a clean environment, some scholars have advocated a constitutional amendment
granting citizens environmental rights. See, e.g., Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for
Future Generations: An Argument for Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181
(1994). Several such amendments have in fact been proposed in Congress. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res.
1205, 91st Cong. (1970) (amendment proposed by Rep. Richard Ottinger); H.R.J. Res. 1321,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ("Every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment.
The United States and every State shall guarantee this right."). For a synopsis of these efforts,
see Gallagher, supra, at 120-29. For a critique of such constitutional amendments, see Theodore
C. Sorensen, The American Constitution: Basic Charter or First Draft?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 709,
710-11 (1998).
28. Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin'": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 530, 530 (1999).
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At least four distinct arguments support the rights-based justifi-
cation. They will be discussed in turn.
A. The Right to Bodily Integrity
The first argument for the rights-based justification is that indi-
viduals possess a fundamental right to bodily integrity that is com-
promised by high levels of pollution. In 1914, then-Judge Cardozo ex-
plained that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”29 A com-
mentator has observed that “[s]ince then, both federal and state
courts have recognized that a basic ‘right of an individual’ is ‘that
his . . . person be held inviolable.’”30 Significantly, the Supreme Court
has recognized the importance of this right.31
While no court has suggested that high pollution levels violate
this constitutional right, the legal recognition of the right to bodily in-
tegrity demonstrates that our society places a high value upon the in-
violability of each individual’s person. Our society does not feel that
individual rights are violated whenever citizens are exposed to any
amount of pollution, no matter how small. After all, American courts
have never held—and the American public has never believed—that
individuals have a right to inviolability of their persons regardless of
the social cost. Instead, the Supreme Court has noted that “against
the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable . . . must
be set the interests of society.”32 Certain levels of pollution are un-
avoidable in modern society. If “the issue [were] simply leaving the
earth as it is . . ., only remaining as cave dwellers would have been ac-
29. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).
30. Vic Sher, Breaking Out of the Box: Toxic Risk, Government Actions, and Constitutional
Rights, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145, 157 (1998) (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,
439 (1957)). For examples of cases recognizing this right to bodily integrity, see, e.g., United
States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (mentioning "the right of an individual
that his person be held inviolable" in a criminal case where the district court had received in
evidence a bullet which had been surgically removed from the defendant's forearm without his
consent); Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322, 325 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (mentioning the right to
bodily integrity in a case brought by an employee who was terminated based on blood alcohol
test results); In re Guardianship of Richard Roe, 383 Mass. 415 (1981) (holding that noninstitu-
tionalized but mentally incompetent persons possess a protected liberty interest in refusing
treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
31. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
278 (1990).
32. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439.
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ceptable.”33 Nonetheless, it is not at all unreasonable to apply the
principles underlying the right to bodily integrity to individuals’ expo-
sure to pollution. Although there seems to be no objective threshold
beyond which individuals’ exposure to environmental risk becomes
too great,34 it can be reasonably held that at some point elevated levels
of pollution do violate the right to bodily integrity.35 Hence, this ar-
gument contends that there should be some regulatory constraint on
the harm that pollution inflicts on American citizens.
B. The Right to a Healthy Environment
A second argument in favor of the rights-based justification is
that the Constitution grants Americans the right to enjoy a healthy
environment. This position was first introduced in academic journals
around 1970, and has been advanced by “numerous commentators.”36
These commentators contend that the right to “life, liberty and prop-
erty” provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments combines
with the Ninth Amendment’s protection of unenumerated rights to
provide citizens with a constitutional interest in a clean environment.
Environmentalist litigants also advanced the argument for a constitu-
tional right to a clean environment before U.S. courts in the early
1970s.
33. Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
93, 103 (1990); see also, e.g., Janusz Symonides, The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced and
Protected Environment, 20 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 24, 28 n.11 (1992) ("The right to a clean envi-
ronment cannot be interpreted as the right to 'an ideal environment.' In the world today, a cer-
tain degree of pollution is inevitable."); Stephen F. Williams, The Era of "Risk-Risk" and the
Problem of Keeping the APA Up to Date, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (1996) ("There appears
to be a fairly broad social consensus that some pollution is not merely inevitable but justifiable,
in the sense that at some point the incremental costs of pollution control exceed any incre-
mental gain.").
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. Cf. Steinzor, supra note 9, at 370 ("[I]t may well prove very difficult to achieve broad
agreement on the precise level of protection that defines an essential federal floor. However, . . .
in many states the level of protection has fallen well below the norm provided in the more com-
petent jurisdictions.").
36. Daryl S. Landy, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Government Pesticide
Spraying: The Case for Limited Judicial Intervention and an Intermediate Standard of Review, 76
CAL. L. REV. 221, 236 (1988). For early academic work advocating a constitutional right to a
clean environment, see, e.g., John C. Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While
Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32 (1970); William D. Kirchick, The Con-
tinuing Search for a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 515 (1975); Ronald
E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an Environ-
mental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974); John Y. Pearson, Jr., Note, Toward a Constitution-
ally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970).
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The courts have uniformly rejected the suggestion that the Con-
stitution vests environmental rights in American citizens.37 Tanner v.
Armco Steel Corp.38 is particularly instructive in its explication of why
courts have refused to recognize such environmental rights. The Tan-
ner plaintiffs brought suit against private defendants, arguing that the
defendants’ petroleum refineries and plants caused them injury.39 The
defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that federal jurisdic-
tion was lacking, and that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted.40 In response, the plaintiffs asserted a
number of constitutional bases for their claim, including the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with Section 1983.41
The court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs’ Fifth and Ninth
Amendment claims. It rejected the former claim because the Fifth
Amendment only restrains the federal government’s actions, and
does not constrain the actions of private individuals.42 The court also
rejected the argument that the right to a healthy environment was
one of the unenumerated rights to which the Ninth Amendment re-
fers. The court stated that it would be ahistorical to hold that the
Ninth Amendment encompasses environmental rights, and that such
a holding would essentially cause the court to engage in policymak-
ing—a task that the Constitution entrusts to the legislative branch.43
The court somewhat snidely added that “[t]he Ninth Amendment,
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
38. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp, 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
39. Id. at 534.
40. While the defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) &
(b)(6), the court stated that, "[t]o the extent that plaintiffs' response, accompanied by affidavit,
has introduced material dehors the pleadings, the motions shall be treated as prayers for sum-
mary judgment, as authorized by Rule 12(b), Fed. R. Civ. P." Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 534.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
The plaintiffs also contended that the Constitution "in its entirety" provided a basis for
their claim. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 534. The court rejected this position because the argument
was "not a plain statement of the ground upon which the Court's jurisdiction depends, and is
therefore insufficient pleading under Rule 8(a)(1)." Id.
42. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 534-35. See also Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926)
("The Fifth Amendment 'is a limitation only upon the powers of the General Government,' and
is not directed against the action of individuals.") (citation omitted); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 382 (1896) ("[I]t has been settled that the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is a limitation only upon the powers of the General Government, that is, that the
amendment operates solely on the Constitution itself by qualifying the powers of the National
Government . . . .").
43. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 535.
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through its ‘penumbra’ or otherwise, embodies no legally assertable
right to a healthful environment.”44
Most instructive is Tanner’s disposition of the plaintiffs’ Four-
teenth Amendment claims. The plaintiffs contended that their inju-
ries were actionable through the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunc-
tion with Section 1983. To recover under Section 1983, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that they were denied “a right secured by the ‘Constitu-
tion and laws’ of the United States,” and “that the defendant acted
‘under color of law.’”45 The court found that the plaintiffs did not al-
lege state or municipal regulatory involvement sufficient “to clothe
defendants with the mantle of the State for the purposes of Section
1983.”46 The court also found that, even if the plaintiffs could demon-
strate the requisite state action, they could not satisfy the constitu-
tional deprivation requirement. The court provided four distinct rea-
sons for this determination. First, neither the language nor the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that it protects environ-
mental rights.47 Second, the Fourteenth Amendment lacks “decisional
standards to guide a court in determining whether the plaintiffs’ hy-
pothetical environmental rights have been infringed.”48 Third, the ju-
diciary lacks institutional competence in determining environmental
rights, as courts are poorly suited to undertake “the delicate balanc-
ing of competing social interests,” and lack the “specialized expertise”
in this area that other branches of government possess.49 Finally, to
44. Id.
45. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Section 1983 reads, in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
46. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 536.
47. Id. ("[T]here is not a scintilla of persuasive content in the words, origin, or historical
setting of the Fourteenth Amendment to support the assertion that environmental rights were
to be accorded its protection.").
48. Id. Just as "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), neither does it
enact Ms. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring.
49. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 536-37.
It is true that in other contexts judicial decisions both hinge upon the use of scientific or sta-
tistical data, see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954), and also set social pol-
icy for the country, see, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (affirmative action); Grut-
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the extent environmental controversies are justiciable, the court
stated that they should be resolved under nuisance doctrines rather
than through “the wholesale transformation of state tort suits into
federal cases.”50
Although the courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that en-
vironmental rights are constitutionally protected, some courts have
provided encouraging words for the unsuccessful plaintiffs. For ex-
ample, one district court stated that “[s]uch claims, even under our
present Constitution, are not fanciful and may, indeed, some day, in
one way or another, obtain judicial recognition.”51 Another district
court, in a case that one commentator has described as “the closest
any federal court has ever come to recognizing a constitutionally-
protected right to a healthful and clean environment,”52 stated:
I have no difficulty in finding that the right to life and liberty and
property are constitutionally protected. Indeed the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments provide that these rights may not be denied
without due process of law, and surely a person’s health is what, in
a most significant degree, sustains life. So it seems to me that each
of us is constitutionally protected in our natural and personal state
of life and health.53
However, that court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims due to insufficient allegations of either federal or state action.54
In addition to the encouragement that courts have provided oc-
casionally for these constitutional claims, some scholars continue to
ter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (same); Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (as-
sisted suicide); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (passive euthanasia);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion). However, environmental policymaking is substan-
tially more complex than these other areas in which courts have been heavily involved. In the
context of abortion or affirmative action, for example, courts need only determine whether the
challenged policy violates a constitutional right. In contrast, if the Constitution were held to en-
compass environmental rights, courts would not only have to determine whether a right was
violated, but also the precise reduction in environmental risk that the Constitution mandates,
and perhaps even the manner in which this reduction in pollution should occur. Such questions
are more suited to the expertise of administrative agencies than are other questions of social
policy in which the judiciary is regularly involved.
50. Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 537.
51. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark.
1971).
52. Gallagher, supra note 27, at 114.
53. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,794,
20,794-95 (D. Mont. 1970).
54. Id. at 20,794-95. The Hoerner Waldorf plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against a paper
mill company. The court found that there were no allegations of federal action, and that the
state of Montana likewise took no action in relation to the paper mill plant that could constitute
a violation of the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
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argue for a constitutional right to a healthy environment. For exam-
ple, Professor Ledewitz concedes that the recognition of a constitu-
tional right to a clean environment is unlikely “in the immediate po-
litical/jurisprudential context,”55 but believes that environmental
problems will become so grave in the future that they will spur a ju-
risprudential shift.56 He argues that when this shift in judicial outlook
occurs, the right to a clean environment can grow out of “traditional
judicial categories”57—in particular substantive due process58 and
equal protection.59
Although the judiciary has repeatedly rejected the notion that
the Constitution protects environmental rights, the arguments sup-
porting a constitutional right to a clean environment are more persua-
sive in the policy world than the legal world.60 After all, courts have
often seemed receptive to plaintiffs’ moral arguments, but have sim-
55. Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment
in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565, 569 (1998).
56. Id. at 569-83. For a description of the kinds of major environmental crises that may spur
such a jurisprudential shift, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
57. Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 656.
58. The Supreme Court has held that substantive due process rights must be "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,'" Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), and "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'nei-
ther liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)). The Court also requires "a 'careful description' of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest." Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
277-78 (1990)).
Professor Ledewitz argues that the right to a healthy environment is deeply rooted in the
country's history and legal traditions:
In terms of our history, at least since Frederick Jackson Turner announced the end of
the American frontier in 1893, we have had a sense of environmental limit. In terms of
legal tradition, the enormous body of environmental regulation, state constitutional
environmental provisions and common law restrictions reinforce a right to environ-
mental protection. Our practices are largely consistent with history and our laws. No
citizen would think there is a right to pollute the air or land of his or her neighbor.
Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 646.
Professor Ledewitz concedes the difficulty of providing a "careful description" of the right
at issue. Id. Although he suggests that this may mean that "our usual legal categories are out-
dated," id. at 647, Professor Ledewitz does attempt a more specific description of the right to a
healthy environment by arguing that one implication that could be drawn from such a right is
that "other rights should be viewed within an environmental perspective." Id. at 652. This would
have implications, for example, for the Takings Clause and for standing requirements. Id. at
652-55.
59. Professor Ledewitz's equal protection claim is that the Equal Protection Clause should
encompass future generations, and that if it does, then our current discounting of their interests
violates their equal protection rights. This argument is discussed in infra Part I.D.
60. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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ply not found the right to a healthy environment anywhere in the
Constitution.
C. Discrimination
A third rationale for the rights-based justification is that the loca-
tion of pollution is discriminatory in nature. A number of studies in-
dicate “that the hazards posed by pollution and hazardous waste are
borne disproportionately by people of color and the poor.”61 The U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted the seminal study in
1983.62 The GAO study examined the demographics of four host
communities for hazardous waste landfills in the southeast, and found
that three of the four communities were predominantly African-
American.63 Another early study by sociologist Robert Bullard found
that six of the eight incinerators and fifteen of the seventeen landfills
in Houston, Texas were located in predominantly African-American
communities, even though African-Americans constituted only
twenty-eight percent of Houston’s population.64
These two early studies spurred greater interest in the pollution
risks borne by minority communities, and prompted another promi-
nent early study by the United Church of Christ’s Commission for
Racial Justice (CRJ).65 The CRJ study found that “[c]ommunities with
the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the
highest composition of racial and ethnic residents.”66 Later studies
challenged the notion that race was the most determinative factor in
siting decisions.67
61. Sher, supra note 30, at 156.
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (GAO 1983).
63. Id. at 3-4.
64. Robert Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY
273 (1983).
65. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
66. Id. at xiii.
67. See, e.g., Christopher Boerner et al., Environmental Justice? (1994), reprinted in part in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE 167 (Kenneth A. Manaster ed., 1995); Terence J.
Centner et al., Environmental Justice and Toxic Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discrimina-
tory Effect Based on Race and Not Income, 3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 119 (1996); see also Paul Mohai
& Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribu-
tion of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 926 & tbl.1 (1992) (comparing ten
studies that examine the relative importance of race and income in the distribution of environ-
mental risks, of which seven found race to be more important and three found income to be
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Our legal regime includes a number of measures broadly prohib-
iting discrimination, both constitutional and statutory. The Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the states from “denying to any per-
son . . . the equal protection of the laws.”68 Federal statutory
provisions designed to combat discrimination include Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196469 and Section 1983.70 Additionally, “many
states have similar constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
discriminatory action by government agencies.”71 These aspects of the
legal regime demonstrate our society’s categorical condemnation of
racial discrimination. Yet despite the legal regime’s broad guarantees
of equality, lawsuits challenging the location of highly polluting facili-
ties as racially discriminatory have overwhelmingly met with failure.72
The major constitutional provision that has been used to chal-
lenge disproportionate siting of municipal solid waste facilities in mi-
nority neighborhoods is the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, under which the courts subject government
actions that are based on race to strict scrutiny.73 However, plaintiffs
in equal protection suits face the burden of demonstrating that the
government’s actions were motivated by intentional discrimination,
more significant). For an excellent synopsis of the debate over whether race or income is a more
determinative factor in siting decisions, see Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues,
in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 25D.02 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1995).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1994). For more on Title VI, see infra notes 76-85 and accom-
panying text.
70. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
71. Sher, supra note 30, at 157.
72. For treatments of environmental justice litigation, see, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold,
Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 49-
69 (1998); Been, supra note 67, at § 25D.03; Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Jus-
tice: Turning Polluters Into "Good Neighbors" Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 147, 152-71 (2001).
73. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2337-38 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995); Regents of
the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978).
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and not merely that they resulted in a disparate impact.74 No plaintiff
has been able to meet this requirement.75
Environmental justice plaintiffs have met with no greater success
when their claims were based on federal statutory law, rather than on
the Constitution. For example, in the late 1990s a number of com-
mentators focused on Title VI as a promising mechanism for envi-
ronmental justice litigation.76 Section 601 of Title VI provides that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”77 Although “most state
and many local government entities that regulate environmental mat-
ters or issue permits to regulated facilities receive funding from the
74. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (holding that discriminatory intent is required in an equal protection challenge to a
siting decision); E.-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (same);
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979) ("[T]he plaintiffs
must show not just that the decision to grant the permit is objectionable or even wrong, but that
it is attributable to an intent to discriminate on the basis of race.").
75. Arnold, supra note 72, at 51; Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another
Stone in David's Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 538 (1994); Michael B. Gerrard, Reflections
on Environmental Justice, 65 ALB. L. REV. 357, 358 (2001) ("[T]he courts require a showing of
discriminatory intent before allowing an equal protection claim, and no one has ever been able
to prove discriminatory intent in the environmental justice context of a litigation.").
While plaintiffs can attempt to prove discriminatory intent through statistical evidence,
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677, commentators have noted that "the attempt to use statistics in envi-
ronmental justice litigation has been generally unsuccessful," largely because of the degree of
deference afforded to governmental agencies. Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil
Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental Racism: From Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sando-
val, 2 J.L. SOC'Y 5, 22 (2001); see also Cole, supra, at 540-41 (noting that, because of the intent
requirement, civil rights lawyers have come to see environmental justice cases based on the
Equal Protection Clause as "certain losers"); Siegel, supra note 72, at 155 ("[T]he courts have
been unwilling to infer discriminatory intent, even when there is overwhelming evidence of pat-
terns of discriminatory effects resulting from siting decisions.").
76. Title VI was considered promising because "most state and many local government en-
tities that regulate environmental matters or issue permits to regulated facilities receive funding
from the EPA or other federal agencies." Siegel, supra note 72, at 156; see also Michael Fisher,
Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285,
287 (1995) ("If the actions of those federally-funded state agencies create a racially discrimina-
tory distribution of pollution, then a violation of Title VI has occurred."); Alice Kaswan, Envi-
ronmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice", 47 AM. U. L.
REV. 221, 248 (1997) ("Title VI may provide a potential remedy for distributional injustice.");
R. Gregory Roberts, Comment, Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment: Learn-
ing From the Civil Rights Movement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998) ("One strategy that may
hold some promise of success is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.").
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
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EPA or other federal agencies,”78 it has proven extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail in § 601 lawsuits because the courts have held that
plaintiffs are required to demonstrate more than mere “instances of
discriminatory effect or disparate impact.”79 Rather, plaintiffs must
prove that greater environmental risks exist in minority neighbor-
hoods because of intentional discrimination.80 This intent requirement
poses the same barrier that plaintiffs have been unable to satisfy in
lawsuits brought under the Equal Protection Clause.81 Section 602 of
Title VI82 allows agencies to promulgate regulations that employ the
less stringent “discriminatory effect” standard: Thus agency regula-
tions may “apply not only to intentional discrimination but also to
policies and practices that have a discriminatory effect.”83 Although
the EPA has adopted § 602 regulations that use the discriminatory ef-
fect standard,84 these regulations will not bolster environmental jus-
tice plaintiffs’ legal position, as the Supreme Court recently held that
there is no private right of action for “a failure to comply with regula-
tions promulgated under § 602 that is not also a failure to comply with
§ 601” and its intentional discrimination standard.85
78. Siegel, supra note 72, at 156.
79. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir.
1997), dismissed as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
80. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) ("[I]t is . . . beyond dispute . . . that §
601 prohibits only intentional discrimination."); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)
("Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination."); Chester Resi-
dents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F.3d at 929.
81. See Siegel, supra note 72, at 156 ("Because it is extremely difficult to prove intent based
solely on disparate impacts among racial groups, this type of challenge is not available to the
vast majority of individuals."); Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatment of Environmental Jus-
tice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 235 (2002)
("Similar to the Equal Protection cases discussed above, prevailing on a Title VI claim has
proven difficult because courts require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
83. Memorandum from Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, to Heads of De-
partments and Agencies that Provide Federal Financial Assistance 1 (July 14, 1994) (quoted in
Siegel, supra note 72, at 156 n.49).
84. For example, the EPA has implemented regulations prohibiting the siting of facilities in
a location that "has the purpose or effect" of subjecting protected classes to discrimination. 40
C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (2003); see also id. § 7.35(b) (prohibiting recipients of EPA funds from using
criteria or methods of administering their programs which "have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex").
85. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286, 293. This holding was based on the Court's view that § 602
does not confer a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations. The Court
reached this conclusion after analyzing the text and structure of Title VI. See id. at 288-91. Al-
though the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce § 602 regulations that
employ the discriminatory effect standard, the EPA can enforce such regulations by terminating
funding to programs that transgress the regulations.
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Environmental justice plaintiffs attempting to bring claims based
on common law rights, such as toxic tort or nuisance actions, also face
a number of evidentiary barriers. Plaintiffs in toxic tort suits may have
trouble establishing causation,86 while plaintiffs in nuisance suits will
be disadvantaged by the fact that nuisance remedies take into account
the social utility of the defendant’s actions.87
Thus, despite our society’s categorical condemnation of racial
discrimination, plaintiffs challenging the seemingly discriminatory dis-
tribution of environmental risk have not found recourse through the
judicial system. Some proponents of the rights-based justification ar-
gue that this lack of legal recourse justifies additional federal regula-
tion, while others argue that the prevalence of environmental racism
Some commentators have suggested that litigants should attempt to duck the barrier that
Sandoval creates for suing under § 602 regulations by bringing § 1983 claims to enforce the § 602
disparate-impact regulations. See Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 75, at 36-47. However, the suc-
cess of such a strategy hinges on whether regulations implemented pursuant to Title VI create
rights enforceable under § 1983. Unfortunately for environmental justice plaintiffs, three of the
four circuits to consider the issue have held that they do not. See S. Camden Citizens in Action
v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 787-88 (3d Cir. 2001); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993,
1009-10 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) ("An administrative
regulation . . . cannot create an enforceable § 1983 interest not already implicit in the enforcing
statute."). But see Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that,
because administrative regulations have the force of law, they create rights enforceable under §
1983). Siegel states that, although plaintiffs might find greater success in other circuits, "with
three circuits conclusively rejecting the § 1983 argument, there are numerous legal obstacles to
overcome." Siegel, supra note 72, at 159.
86. See, e.g., M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic
Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (1998) ("Th[e] requirement of proving causation is often a heavy
burden for a toxic tort plaintiff."); Steven L. Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People:
Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 311, 323
(1990) (noting that toxic tort suits "typically involve insurmountable causation problems," which
are "especially pronounced in situations in which the instrumentality causing the harm is a
chemical that enters the body unnoticed, has an immediate effect on the body that is undetect-
able, and whose toxicity to humans is unknown or is in dispute"); Scott Richardson, Comment,
Attorney General's Warning: Legislation May Now be Hazardous to Tobacco Companies'
Health, 28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 295 (1995) ("One of the largest problems with toxic tort cases
has been the ability to prove actual causation."). These causation problems are due to "the sci-
entific difficulty of proving that a given injury or ailment was proximately caused by a specific
pollutant emitted by the defendant, and that no other environmental exposure or health habits
contributed to the injury." Siegel, supra note 72, at 168.
87. For cases in which courts balanced the social utility of the defendant's conduct against
the harm to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Fla. East Coast Props., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 572
F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1978); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); Riblet v.
Spokane Portland Cement Co., 248 P.2d 380 (Wash. 1952); see also MICHAEL B. GERRARD,
WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE
SITING 72 (1994) (noting that, because courts consider the social utility of the defendant's activ-
ity, "many people injured by activities deemed by the courts to be socially necessary" are denied
redress).
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means that devolution of environmental responsibilities to the states
is fraught with peril. For example, Bullard writes that “[i]ndividuals
who suffered under the era of ‘states rights’ (during the height of ‘Jim
Crow’) are leery of the federal government’s delegating more respon-
sibility for environmental protection, enforcement, and permitting to
the states that routinely disregard the rights of their citizens.”88
D. Environmental Crisis
A final argument underlying the rights-based justification, which
I refer to as the “environmental crisis” rationale, focuses more on the
rights of future generations than the present one. The environmental
crisis rationale holds that a number of environmental problems could
develop into major crises capable of dramatically affecting life on
earth, perhaps even threatening the human race.89 Although some
commentators, such as Professor Ledewitz, focus on the potential im-
pact of global warming,90 climate change is only one of a number of
88. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 158 (3d ed. 2000).
89. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 36, at 34 ("With regard to environmental questions, one
might go further and say that human life—not to mention human progress—may end com-
pletely if new uses cannot be made from old legal implements."); Schlickeisen, supra note 27, at
181 ("Scientists have predicted that a significant proportion of the world's plant and animal spe-
cies will become extinct within the next several decades despite present conservation efforts.
This trend has serious implications for the human future . . . ."). But see GREGG EASTERBROOK,
A MOMENT ON EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM xi (1995) (predict-
ing the eradication of pollution "within our lifetimes"); BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001) (criticizing envi-
ronmental organizations' use of scientific evidence as highly selective, and hence misleading).
90. See Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 579. The case that the earth is getting warmer is based
on computer models, see Prepared Statement of Michael C. MacCracken, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Mar. 6, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File ("[M]odels are at the cutting edge of
what we understand. . . . [O]nly models can provide quantitative projections of future condi-
tions."), satellite data, see Satellite Data Signal Hot Future; Climatologists' Study Challenges Old
Findings, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Missouri), Mar. 12, 1997, at 8A, and observational trends,
see Ross Gelbspan, The Heat is On: The Warming of the World's Climate Sparks a Blaze of De-
nial, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1995, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File (outlining "geo-
physical events and scientific findings" that suggest a trend toward a warmer climate). Because
of these observational trends, some scientists believe that we are already experiencing the ef-
fects of climate change. For example, one study found that "global warming is helping spread
disease" in humans and wildlife. Andrea Dorfman & Michael D. Lemonick, More Frogs, Fewer
Monarchs, TIME, July 1, 2002, at 57 (describing a new study in Science). Also, following an inci-
dent in which a Rhode Island-sized piece of ice broke off from the Larsen B ice shelf, a scientist
commented, "With the disappearance of ice shelves that have existed for thousands of years,
you rather rapidly run out of . . . explanations [other than global warming]." Andrew C. Revkin,
Large Ice Shelf in Antarctica Disintegrates at Great Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at A13
(quoting Dr. Theodore A. Scambos). Some authors argue that, because of the catastrophic im-
pacts that global warming could produce, the "precautionary principle" dictates that action be
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environmental problems that these commentators believe to be capa-
ble of developing into major ecological catastrophes. Other environ-
mental problems include species loss,91 deforestation,92 and ozone de-
pletion.93
taken to stem climate change now, rather than waiting until absolute scientific certainty is at-
tained. See CHRISTOPHER FLAVIN & ODIL TUNALI, CLIMATE OF HOPE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
STABILIZING THE WORLD'S ATMOSPHERE 20 (Worldwatch Paper No. 130, June 1996).
For discussion of the problems that global warming could produce, see, e.g., STEPHEN
OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED 133 (1992) ("If climate
changes are of the magnitude that a majority of scientists are predicting . . . . [m]any species will
not be able to adapt quickly enough, and extinctions will dwarf any that have been predicted,
because habitats will shift, shrink, or disappear."); Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The
Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental Health-and-Safety Regula-
tion, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1830-31 (2002); Jennifer Woodward, Comment, Turning Down
the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
203, 213-17 (1989).
For a more skeptical view of global warming, see, e.g., RONALD BAILEY, ECO-SCAM 152-53
(1993) (arguing that if increased carbon dioxide did produce a warmer climate, it would be
"nothing like the climate disaster predicted by the apocalyptics"); LOMBORG, supra note 89, at
258-324; DIXY LEE RAY, ENVIRONMENTAL OVERKILL 18 (1993) (arguing that any warming of
the climate would be slow, allowing humans to adapt); Bjørn Lomborg, The Environmentalists
Are Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at A15 ("[D]espite our intuition that we need to do
something drastic about global warming, economic analyses show that it will be far more expen-
sive to cut carbon dioxide emissions radically than to pay the costs of adapting to the increased
temperatures.").
91. See, e.g., Susan George et al., The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to
Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1997) ("[A]pproximately fifty thousand spe-
cies disappear from the planet each year. Although extinction is a natural process, humans have
greatly accelerated historical rates of extinction by one hundred to one thousand times."); Fran-
cesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145, 150-56 (2002); Schlickeisen,
supra note 27, at 186-87 (explaining that species loss diminishes the potential for medical break-
throughs, threatens food supplies, and "could impair the ability of natural ecosystems to regu-
late atmospheric gases, purify water, decompose wastes, generate fertile soils, provide food di-
rectly, cycle vital nutrients and control insects and wildlife diseases that destroy crops and
otherwise impact human health"); Ajay K. Sharma, The Global Loss of Biodiversity: A Perspec-
tive in the Context of the Controversy Over Intellectual Property Rights, 4 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (1995) ("The potential importance, in economic terms, of this undiscovered mass
of biodiversity cannot be underestimated, for even the rubber tree 'was just another Amazonian
tree species of unknown economic value' until it was discovered.").
For the view that the problem of species loss is overstated, see, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note
89, at 249-57; Ariel E. Lugo, Biodiversity and Public Policy: The Middle of the Road, in
PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY 33, 34 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A.
McNeely eds., 1998) (suggesting that, as additional data is gathered, "species loss estimates are
likely to be lower than those normally given today"); David Schoenbrod, The Mau-Mauing of
Bjørn Lomborg, COMMENT., Sept. 2002, at 51, 54 ("[M]ost mainstream scientific estimates of
species loss actually run much lower, on the order of 0.7 percent over the next 50 years: 'not a
catastrophe, but a problem—one of many that mankind still needs to solve.'").
92. See, e.g., Priya Alagiri, Comment, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Coun-
tries' Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 485, 487 (1992) ("Deforestation
threatens one-half of the earth's life forms, including thousands of indigenous groups living off
the forests. These groups depend on the forest for fuel, cooking, energy, and medicine. Defores-
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The ecological problems that these commentators focus on are
more likely to have a significant effect on future generations than on
the present one. Thus, advocates of the environmental crisis rationale
for federal intervention argue that future generations should be af-
forded environmental rights in the present. Some scholars’ arguments
are rooted in the values expressed by the Constitution, while others
present a purely moral case.
Professor Ledewitz’s argument is rooted in constitutional values.
He argues that future generations should be protected by the Consti-
tution because they are bound by it.94 Moreover, he frames the Con-
stitution as “an intra-family relationship.”95 Although Professor Le-
dewitz concedes that the family structure does not prevent one
generation from squandering all the resources that could otherwise be
enjoyed by future generations, he contends that “it would not be
wrong, nor incoherent, nor keeping out of the structure of a family, to
permit . . . intergenerational intervention.”96 If future generations are
indeed afforded rights under the Constitution, then, Professor Le-
dewitz contends, environmental destruction that is likely to harm
their well-being may violate their equal protection rights.
tation would consequently [impoverish] approximately one billion people."); Jacqueline Klosek,
Note, The Destruction of the Brazilian Amazon: An International Problem, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 119 (1998); Erin B. Newman, Note & Comment, Earth's Vanishing Medicine Cabi-
net: Rain Forest Destruction and Its Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 AM. J. L. & MED.
479, 484-87 (1994).
For a different view of the problems that deforestation poses, see, e.g., WALLACE
KAUFMAN, NO TURNING BACK 72 (1994); LOMBORG, supra note 89, at 110-17 (concluding that
"[b]asically, . . . our forests are not under threat").
93. See, e.g., Nancy D. Adams, Comment, Title VI of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
and State and Local Initiatives to Reverse the Stratospheric Ozone Crisis: An Analysis of Pre-
emption, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 174-81 (1991) (examining the scientific case that
ozone depletion is occurring, and outlining its harms to humans and the environment); Edward
D. McCutcheon, Note, Think Globally, (En) Act Locally: Promoting Effective National Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Infrastructures in Developing Nations, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 395, 404
(1998) ("Although difficult to predict, ozone depletion and increased ultra-violet radiation may
have long term consequences such as health problems and less productive fishing and agricul-
ture development.").
For the view that ozone depletion does not pose a major threat, see LOMBORG, supra note
89, at 273-76.
94. Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 661-62 ("[T]hose future generations that find themselves
part of the 'deal' ought to get something out of it."). (But don't those future generations get
something out of the "deal" through the rights enshrined in the Constitution, and through the
system of government that it establishes?)
95. Id.; see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 4 (1992) ("[T]o participate in constitutional governance
is to participate in an intergenerational project.").
96. Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 662.
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The Equal Protection Clause provides special protection to any
group that can be considered a “discrete and insular minority.”97 Pro-
fessor Ledewitz argues that future generations should be considered a
discrete and insular minority because “equal protection ‘precludes a
refusal to represent’ any group that has a right to representation in
the political process.”98 To that extent, Professor Ledewitz argues that
future generations’ political representation will be ineffective unless
the Equal Protection Clause protects their environmental rights:
Our refusal to act [to prevent an impending ecological crisis] is
completely rational. The odd thing is that we ever do anything for
future generations. Given a ten percent discount rate, “the present
value of saving a life one hundred years from now is only $ 581.”
And even this observation assumes that we care at all about lives
saved a hundred years from now. Frankly, why should we?99
On the other hand, Professor Weiss’s argument for
intergenerational equity is not based on constitutional values, but in-
stead is purely moral in nature. Professor Weiss argues that the lack
of a priori knowledge each generation possesses about at what point
in time it will exist creates a moral imperative for that generation to
protect the environment for future generations:
In order to define what intergenerational fairness means in using
and conserving our common patrimony, it is useful to view the hu-
man community as a partnership among all generations. . . . The
purpose of human society must be to realize and protect the wel-
fare and well-being of every generation. This requires sustaining
the life-support systems of the planet, the ecological processes, en-
vironmental conditions, and cultural resources important for the
survival and well-being of the human species, and a healthy and de-
cent human environment.
Although all generations are members of this partnership, no gen-
eration knows before it is a living generation at what point in time
it will be the living generation, nor how many members it will have,
nor even how many generations there will ultimately be. . . .
[I]t is appropriate to assume the perspective of a generation that is
placed somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does not know
in advance where it will be located. Such a generation would want
97. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
98. Ledewitz, supra note 55, at 667 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 82 (1980)).
99. Id. at 666 (quoting Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste
Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 706, 742-
43 (1998)).
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to inherit the common patrimony of the planet in as good condition
as it has been for any previous generation and to have as good ac-
cess to it as previous generations. This requires that each genera-
tion pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received it and
provide equitable access to its resources and benefits.100
In addition to the arguments for affording environmental rights
to future generations, some philosophers argue that we should act
now to prevent major ecological crises because nature itself possesses
intrinsic value.101
The environmental crisis rationale suggests that the federal gov-
ernment should impose constraints on overall levels of environmental
harm, because a regulatory system that provides such limits on pollu-
tion would help to safeguard the environment.
II.  THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
One criticism that can be directed at the rights-based justifica-
tion’s advocates is that they have not sufficiently outlined the justifi-
cation’s implications. However, if the rights-based justification is seen
as a compelling reason for federal intervention, then two basic princi-
ples for the regulatory system with respect to the justification seem
logically inescapable. First, the regulatory system should effectively
guarantee citizens’ environmental rights. Second, however, the justifi-
cation’s persuasive force diminishes as a regulation’s relationship to
the justification becomes more attenuated.102 The present system vio-
lates the first of these principles and pays insufficient attention to the
second, as the regulatory system is both overinclusive and underinclu-
sive with respect to the rights-based justification.
The regulatory system is overinclusive because federal regula-
tions apply even where aggregate pollution levels are low enough that
citizens’ environmental rights are not violated. Regulatory overinclu-
100. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 23-24 (1989); see also
Schlickeisen, supra note 27, at 190-97 (explaining philosophers' arguments concerning society's
moral responsibility to future generations).
101. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269,
293 (1989) ("According to modern 'deep ecologists,' all living things 'have inherent value and
have moral significance independent of their use by human beings, or even of human exis-
tence.'") (quoting P.S. Elder, Legal Rights for Nature—The Wrong Answer to the Right(s)
Question, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 285, 286 (1984)); Sarah Krakoff, Mountains Without Hand-
rails . . . Wilderness Without Cellphones, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 418 (2003) ("The non-
anthropocentric view maintains that nature has inherent value, apart from any value to hu-
mans.").
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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siveness is problematic for three reasons. First, regulations inherently
impose costs on the regulated parties. Even if regulated entities are in
no danger of exceeding the statutory limitation on emissions, they will
have to expend resources “finding out what the law is, how it applies
to them, what they must do to comply, and how they must demon-
strate compliance to a regulator.”103 Costs are especially likely to be
imposed on regulated entities because the regulatory system does not
account for cumulative risks. Thus, while pollution levels in a certain
region may be extraordinarily low, and the environment relatively
pristine, there may be high levels of a particular pollutant—for exam-
ple, carbon monoxide. We may not consider these carbon monoxide
levels particularly problematic insofar as the rights-based justification
is concerned because environmental risk in the area is so low that the
presence of carbon monoxide does not violate citizens’ environmental
rights. Nonetheless, firms in the area must comply with carbon mon-
oxide regulations because the regulatory system does not consider
cumulative risk levels, and thus does not account for the low aggre-
gate environmental risk in that region. Second, environmental regula-
tions inherently involve administrative costs.104 Third, these costs are
magnified when the regulations shift seemingly localized policy ques-
tions from the states to the federal government.105
The system is also underinclusive because it fails to guarantee
any minimal level of environmental quality. Absent some threshold
that environmental risk cannot exceed, the regulatory system cannot
ensure that an individual is not exposed to unacceptable levels.106
However, rather than providing a cap on environmental risk, the
regulatory system is composed of firm-by-firm, pollutant-by-
pollutant, and medium-by-medium environmental standards that do
not, and cannot, provide such a constraint.107
103. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 31 (1995); see also
Ernest S. Rosenberg, Clean Air Act Reform: A Necessity for the Act's Survival, 14 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 115, 120 (1996) (discussing problems involved in demonstrating compliance with the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments).
104. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 103, at 30; Stewart, supra note 9, at 28 ("[T]he U.S. envi-
ronmental regulatory system suffers from a number of well-known shortcomings, including . . .
high compliance and administrative costs.").
105. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
106. On this point, the concept of side constraints is informative. See ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29-33 (1974).
107. Numerous commentators have criticized the firm-by-firm, pollutant-by-pollutant, and
medium-by-medium manner in which federal regulation proceeds. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach,
The Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 26-
29, 43-51 (1997); Stuart L. Deutsch, Setting Priorities: Principles to Improve Environmental Pol-
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This Part examines the structure of environmental regulations,
and argues that the regulatory system fits poorly with the rights-based
justification. My analysis divides the status quo into two regulatory
paradigms: technology-based standards and ambient standards. Al-
though these are not the only two federal regulatory paradigms, they
are the only two models that directly mandate a reduction in envi-
ronmental risk. For example, there is also an information-based
regulatory model. Two prominent information-based regulations fo-
cus on disseminating information about environmental conditions to
the public108 and making federal agencies consider the environmental
consequences of their actions.109 While such regulations may ulti-
mately reduce aggregate pollution levels,110 they do not do so directly.
icy, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 43, 51 (1992); E. Donald Elliot, Toward Ecological Law and Policy,
in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 170
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) ("[M]ost of today's environmental law vio-
lates the basic principles of ecology. Nature teaches the connected-ness of all activities, but most
current-generation law regulates separate pollutants with little consideration of ecosystems as a
whole."); Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting
the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1, 6-18 (1992); Keith Pezzoli, Environmental Management Sys-
tems (EMSs) and Regulatory Innovation, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 335, 345-46 (2000); Paulette L.
Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Al-
ternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 237, 256-57 (2000); Stewart, supra note 9,
at 27-33.
This criticism has even been raised by EPA Administrators. For example, Carol Browner
leveled this criticism during the Common Sense Initiative's unveiling. EPA Unveils Plan to Con-
solidate Rules for Certain Industries, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at A16 (quoting Browner as
saying that "too often our environmental activities have been compartmentalized, law by law,
pollutant by pollutant"). Both Browner and William K. Reilly have written about the issue. See
Carol M. Browner, Symposium Foreword, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 447, 449 (1997) (stating
that the Common Sense Initiative's approach "recognizes that merely regulating on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis was not enough"); William K. Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 355 (1989) (stating that the regulatory system's "pollutant by pollutant,
facility by facility, medium by medium" approach should be reevaluated).
108. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§
11001-11050 (1994), requires corporations to provide information about their use of specified
toxic substances. EPCRA does not place any limitations upon the emission of these toxic sub-
stances.
109. NEPA requires, inter alia, that all federal agencies prepare environmental impact
statements for major actions likely to significantly affect the quality of the environment, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), and study alternatives to actions involving unresolved resource conflicts,
id. § 4332(2)(E). The Supreme Court has held that NEPA is only a procedural tool, and does
not require specific substantive outcomes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
110. For example, commentators argue that NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) requirement brings the ecological consequences of proposed projects to the public's atten-
tion. Stephen S. Edelson, The Management of Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Wilderness
Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 905, 928 (1982); Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environ-
mental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
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Instead, they either depend on public pressure to spur reductions in
pollution111 or assume that federal agencies will implement more envi-
ronmentally sensitive policies after examining the ecological effects of
their proposed actions.112
A. Technology-Based Standards
1. Synopsis
The goal of technology-based standards is to regulate the pollu-
tion control technology employed by major emitters of the regulated
pollutants. The two major technology-based standards are design
standards and performance standards. Design standards are more on-
erous, as they actually “specify how a certain plant, piece of machin-
ery, or pollution control apparatus should be designed.”113 Perform-
ance standards allow firms more leeway in determining how they will
control their pollution output.114 Rather than mandating specific tech-
nologies, these standards set a performance level that the firm must
meet, and allow firms to determine how they will achieve it. Because
REV. 547, 549 (1992). In turn, public pressure may "induce a federal agency to find less damag-
ing ways of achieving [its] mission." Stewart, supra, at 549.
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), which is a part of EPCRA, can also generate public
pressure. See Gary D. Bass & Alair MacLean, Enhancing the Public's Right-to-Know About
Environmental Issues, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 291-303 (1993) (providing background on TRI);
Barbara Ann Clay, Note & Comment, The EPA's Proposed Phase-III Expansion of the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI) Reporting Requirements: Everything and the Kitchen Sink, 15 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 304-09 (1997) (same). For example, "[s]hortly after the first TRI was
released in 1989, citizen groups placed a full-page advertisement in the New York Times listing
'the corporate top ten' land, water, and air polluters." ROBERT C. ANDERSON & ANDREW Q.
LOHOF, THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION CONTROL POLICY 9-6 (1997) (report prepared for the Environmental Law
Institute), at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eerm.nsf/vwRepNumLookup/EE0216A?Open
Document. Subsequently, a number of the named corporations entered into voluntary
agreements to reduce their effluent outputs. Id.
111. Tseming Yang, Environmental Regulation, Tort Law and Environmental Justice: What
Could Have Been, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 607, 615 n.32 (2002) (noting that EPCRA "rest[s] on the
assumption that regulators and polluters will be more responsive to and take better care of envi-
ronmental interests if they can be held accountable by political processes and public pressure").
112. See Stewart, supra note 110, at 549.
113. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 153.
114. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 573 (1979) ("The regulator often will have to choose
between 'design' standards, which are readily enforceable, and 'performance' standards, which
encourage the development of new technology."); Lorena Bark Malecha et al., San Francisco
Bay Area Boatyards: A Case Study in Regulating Small Polluters, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
453, 474-75 (1993) ("Even within the ambit of command and control regulation, significant em-
phasis is placed now on the value of the flexibility that performance standards afford relative to
design standards.").
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of the greater flexibility that they allow, performance standards are
now more widely used than design standards.
The Clean Air Act’s (CAA) New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS)115 are a paradigmatic example of performance standards. The
NSPS apply to all new stationary sources that the EPA determines to
cause, “or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”116 After
the EPA designates such sources, the agency promulgates regulations
that establish performance standards for them.117 The CAA specifies
that these performance standards should reflect the pollution reduc-
tions achievable through “the application of the best system of emis-
sion reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been ade-
quately demonstrated.”118 In setting this standard, the Administrator
can take into account both the costs of reduction and “any non-air
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements.”119
A second example of technology-based standards can be found
in the Clean Water Act (CWA).120 The CWA required that all point
sources that discharged pollution into U.S. waters (other than pub-
licly owned treatment works121) were to comply with “best available”
technology (BAT) standards by 1977, and “best practicable” technol-
ogy (BPT) standards by 1983.122 The CWA specifies the factors that
the Administrator must consider in promulgating both BAT and BPT
standards. For example, it mandates that in assessing BPT standards,
the Administrator should consider
the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, . . . the age
of the equipment and the facilities involved, the process employed,
the engineering aspects of the application of various types of con-
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
116. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A). For this section of the CAA, "new source" means any stationary
source the construction or modification of which began after the regulations were published. Id.
§ 7411(a)(2).
Similar standards also apply for certain pollutants emitted by sources that pre-existed the
regulations. The CAA provides that the EPA should establish a procedure by which states are
required to submit a plan for performance standards for pollutants emitted by existing sources
that would have been covered by the NSPS if they came from new sources. Id. § 7411(d)(1).
117. Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B).
118. Id. § 7411(a)(1).
119. Id.
120. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
121. Publicly owned treatment works were required to implement pollution reductions
based on "secondary treatment." Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B); see also id. § 1314(d)(1) (explaining sec-
ondary treatment information).
122. Id. § 1311(b).
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trol techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental
impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as
the Administrator deems appropriate.123
A number of other federal statutes also employ technology-
based standards. One example is the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA),124 which regulates hazardous wastes. Enacted in
1976 as a response to the growth in hazardous waste sites,125 RCRA
established permit requirements for facilities that treat, store, and
dispose of hazardous waste,126 and a system designed to track hazard-
ous wastes.127 The permit requirements are designed “to ensure haz-
ardous wastes are directed to and maintained by a suitable facility.”128
This goal is accomplished through a system of regulations that sets
minimum requirements for facilities treating, storing or disposing of
hazardous wastes, and prohibits land disposal of untreated wastes of
which the EPA does not explicitly approve.129 RCRA’s standards ap-
ply facility by facility, and do not place a limit on the number of haz-
ardous waste-generating facilities that can be located within a com-
munity.130 Another example is the Safe Drinking Water Act
123. Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B). The factors that the Administrator should consider in promulgat-
ing the BAT standards are similar. See id. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). For an overview of RCRA, see Randolph L. Hill, An
Overview of RCRA: The "Mind Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental
Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,254 (1991).
125. Theodore Waugh, Where Do We Go from Here: Legal Controls and Future Strategies
for Addressing the Transportation of Hazardous Wastes Across International Borders, 11
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 477, 483 (2000); David A. Rich, Comment, Personal Liability for Haz-
ardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
643, 643 (1986).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1994).
127. Id. § 6922.
128. Stefan A. Noe, Comment, "Willful Blindness": A Better Doctrine for Holding Corporate
Officers Criminally Responsible for RCRA Violations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1461, 1464 (1993).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
130. It is also worth mentioning the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), as it and RCRA have "com-
plementary objectives." PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 201. RCRA functions as the ex ante
component of hazardous waste regulation, and CERCLA functions as the ex post component.
CERCLA was enacted in the wake of the media whirlwind that the Love Canal incident
produced. Id. at 263-64. Professor Percival describes the incident:
In 1953, the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had transferred title to a 16-
acre site to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for the sum of one dollar. The com-
pany acknowledged that it had buried chemicals on the site, which it had covered with
a layer of clay, and the deed of sale stated that the company would not be responsible
for any injuries that might occur. A school and 100 homes were built on the site, which
became known as Love Canal. Following heavy rains in 1978, a chemical soup began
seeping into residential basements. More than 80 chemical compounds were found, in-
cluding many known carcinogens. Ultimately, 1,000 families were relocated and homes
along the canal were demolished. Love Canal became a national media event that crys-
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(SDWA),131 which requires the EPA to establish maximum contami-
nant levels (MCLs) that place limitations on the amount of pollutants
that can be emitted into public drinking water systems.132 The SDWA
specifies that the MCLs, which operate on a firm-by-firm basis,
should come as close as feasible to “the level at which no known or
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which
allows an adequate margin of safety.”133 The feasibility test that the
SDWA employs takes into account the “best technology . . . avail-
able.”134
Additionally, the two regulations designed to combat toxic
health risks, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)135 and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),136
also employ technology-based standards. FIFRA is the preeminent
federal law regulating the pesticide industry.137 Its twin goals are to
protect humans and the environment from the harms of pesticides,
and to allow growers to use pesticides effectively for pest control.138
FIFRA requires that manufacturers register pesticides before selling
them on the marketplace.139 In their registration application, manufac-
turers are required to present to the agency all data they possess con-
cerning the pesticide’s safety, and the EPA may require any addi-
tional data that it believes necessary to demonstrate the pesticide’s
safety.140 In addition to the registration process, FIFRA authorizes the
tallized a festering problem in terms that provoked an emotional response from the
public.
Id. at 263. For more on the Love Canal incident, see, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691-98 (1999). CERCLA was
designed to remedy problems encountered while attempting to respond to the Love Canal re-
lease through legislation that existed at that time. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 264.
The core of CERCLA consists of liability provisions for the costs of hazardous waste re-
moval and remedial action, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994), and authorization for the EPA to spend
Superfund monies for removal and remediation operations, id. § 9611.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-300(j)(26) (1994).
132. Id. §§ 300f(3), 300g-1.
133. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4).
134. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(D).
135. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994). For an overview of FIFRA, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch. 5 (2d ed. 1994).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
137. See John M. Megara, Comment, The Rose Industry Exception for Early Entry into Pes-
ticide Treated Greenhouses: Romance in Regulation, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 941, 941
(1998).
138. Linda J. Fisher et al., A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act: Part I, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,449, 10,450 (1994).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994).
140. Id. § 136a(c).
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EPA to ban unreasonably dangerous pesticides.141 FIFRA does not,
however, regulate the cumulative levels of pesticide-based risk in
foods. Likewise, TSCA requires manufacturers to provide the EPA
with pre-manufacture notice of their intention to produce a new
chemical at least ninety days in advance, and to demonstrate that the
chemical will not present “an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
the environment.”142 If the EPA believes the chemical would pose an
unreasonable risk, it can revoke registration.143 Like FIFRA, TSCA’s
goal is not to control the cumulative levels of pesticide-based risk in
foods, but rather to prevent pesticides that pose unreasonable risks
from coming to market.
2. Evaluation
Technology-based standards are both overinclusive and underin-
clusive insofar as the rights-based justification is concerned. The stan-
dards are overinclusive because nothing prevents technology-based
standards from applying in areas where the cumulative environmental
risk is so low that environmental rights are not violated.144 The stan-
dards are simultaneously underinclusive because they “make[] no ef-
fort to determine aggregate exposure levels; therefore, some indi-
viduals may in fact be less protected than the minimum.”145 The major
reason that technology-based standards fail to constrain aggregate
exposure levels is that they operate on a firm-by-firm basis, with no
regard to the quantity of firms that are concentrated in a specific
area.146 The NSPS program, for one, illustrates this failure: The pro-
gram only ensures that each individual firm complies with the man-
dated emission standards, and does not prevent a massive concentra-
tion of polluting firms. This problem is endemic to all of the
regulatory programs discussed in supra Part II.A.1 that employ tech-
nology-based standards.
141. Id. § 136d.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1), (b)(2)(B).
143. Id. § 2605.
144. See Revesz, supra note 7, at 545 (noting that the present system "regulates more than
that which has a claim to quasi-constitutional legitimacy").
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Michael Gregory, Environment, Sustainable Development, Public Participation
and the NAFTA: A Retrospective, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 99, 137 (1992) (criticizing technology-
based standards for "ignor[ing] the aggregate effects of multiple pollution sources"); Kenneth
M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Overview,
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503, 530 (1995) (noting that technology-based standards "may fail
to produce an acceptable ambient environment if . . . polluters are numerous").
032204 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS.DOC 04/26/04  10:57 AM
2003] AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED JUSTIFICATION 215
A second reason why technology-based standards do not con-
strain aggregate risk levels is that the standards do not account for the
polluters’ size.147 Performance standards are generally proportional to
firm size. For example, the EPA has promulgated regulations pursu-
ant to the NSPS legislation limiting electric utilities to 1.2 pounds of
sulfur dioxide per million BTU of heat inputs.148 Hence, pollution lev-
els may be great in areas where firms have high heat inputs.
Third, technology-based standards operate on a medium-by-
medium basis. The CAA is every bit as unconcerned that a large
amount of hazardous waste-based risk exists in a certain neighbor-
hood as RCRA is about air pollution-based risk. Even if technology-
based standards are effective at limiting individual exposure to envi-
ronmental risk and local degradation within a given medium, pollut-
ants from other media could overwhelm these successes.
However, technology-based standards may not even effectively
reduce environmental risk within a given medium because they oper-
ate in a pollutant-by-pollutant manner. For example, a regulation that
mandates a reduction in particulate matter, carbon monoxide and sul-
fur dioxide does not prevent polluters from increasing their emissions
of lead and nitrogen dioxide.
B. Ambient Standards
1. Synopsis
Although technology-based standards are ineffective at control-
ling aggregate pollution levels within a community even for those
pollutants that they regulate, ambient regulatory standards are more
effective in this regard. The most prominent example of federal am-
bient standards can be found in the CAA, which features national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for “criteria pollutants.”149
The name “criteria pollutants” derives from the fact that the EPA
publishes a list of pollutants whose emissions are anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare, and issues criteria for them indicating
the levels at which the pollutants are believed to threaten life or
147. This is particularly true of design standards, which mandate only that firms use specific
kinds of pollution control technology.
148. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876, 24,879
(Dec. 23, 1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (2003)).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994).
032204 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS.DOC 04/26/04  10:57 AM
216 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 14.1
property.150 The six criteria pollutants are ozone, particulate matter,
carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, lead, and sulfur dioxide.151
After the EPA has promulgated NAAQS, the CAA requires
states to adopt state implementation plans (SIPs) to implement, main-
tain, and enforce the NAAQS.152 In the SIPs, “each state determines
the quantity of pollutants each source within that state is allowed to
emit.”153 Each state then submits its SIP to the EPA for approval.154
Even after accepting a SIP, the EPA may require later revisions if the
state plan is found inadequate to attain or maintain the NAAQS or
“to otherwise comply with any requirement of” the CAA.155
The CAA specifies that primary ambient standards should be set
at a level “requisite to protect the public health,” and that secondary
standards should be set at a level “requisite to protect the public wel-
fare.”156 The CAA defines the “public welfare” broadly. Under the
statute, the public welfare includes adverse effects on soil, water
quality, agriculture, wildlife, property, transportation, visibility and
comfort.157 The CAA states that air quality criteria should “accurately
reflect the latest scientific knowledge.”158 In particular, the criteria
should reflect “variable factors” such as atmospheric conditions that
can alter the effects of pollution, and should take into account possi-
ble interactions with other pollutants that may magnify the overall
health or ecological impact.159
If a state is noncompliant with the NAAQS, it is classified as a
nonattainment area. Nonattainment areas are required to make rea-
sonable further progress every year, with the goal of meeting the am-
150. Id. § 7408(a)(1); see also Bennett A. Caplan, Comment, The Applicability of Clean Air
Act Section 115 to Canada's Transboundary Acid Precipitation Problem, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 539, 559-60 (1984).
151. 40 C.F.R. § 50 (2003).
152. The CAA creates air quality control regions that consist of "any interstate area or ma-
jor intrastate area" which the EPA "deems necessary or appropriate for the attainment and
maintenance" of NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c). Each state must submit a SIP to the EPA de-
scribing how the state plans to achieve and maintain the NAAQS for all air quality control re-
gions within its jurisdiction. Id.
153. Caplan, supra note 150, at 560.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
155. Id. § 7410(k)(5).
156. Id. § 7409(b).
157. Id. § 7402(h). For a discussion of problems faced in the promulgation of these stan-
dards, see PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 551-52.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).
159. Id.
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bient standards.160 However, Congress has often postponed ambient
air quality compliance requirements “to accommodate economic and
energy concerns.”161
2. Evaluation
Like technology-based standards, ambient standards are overin-
clusive. The NAAQS, for example, apply even citizens’ environ-
mental rights are not violated because cumulative risks are low.
Moreover, while ambient standards are at least capable—in theory—
of providing a constraint on aggregate pollution within the medium
that they regulate, they are still underinclusive with respect to the
rights-based justification.
The main reason that ambient standards are underinclusive is
because they only apply on a medium-by-medium basis. Pollutants
from other media could create threats to individual health or local
environmental quality that overwhelm the effect of the ambient stan-
dards. For example, the NAAQS apply only to air pollution; risk lev-
els produced by hazardous waste and water pollution could over-
whelm the ambient standards’ protection.
Also, while ambient standards are theoretically capable of con-
straining pollution within the medium that they regulate, in practice
these standards are implemented on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis.
The NAAQS, for example, only apply to the six listed criteria pollut-
ants, and thus fall far short of regulating air pollution as a medium:
160. Id. § 7502(a)(2)(A).
161. Todd B. Adams, New Source Review Under the Clean Air Act: Time for More Market-
Based Incentives?, 8 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2000). For example, Congress has repeatedly
waived automobile emissions standards to help car manufacturers. Id.; see also GARY C.
BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990, at 81-85 (1995). Con-
gress has also provided additional time for areas to meet the ambient standards in both the 1977
and 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Id. at 103, 107; Adams, supra, at 11.
In contrast to nonattainment areas, attainment areas—those that comply with the
NAAQS—are covered by the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7470 (1994). The PSD program provides each attainment area with an allowable increase from
its baseline concentration of pollution. Id. § 7473(b). The allowable increase depends on
whether the area is designated as Class I, Class II, or Class III. Class I areas, which are either
parks or wilderness areas, are allowed the least increase in pollution. Id. §§ 162, 163. One policy
explanation for the PSD program is that the NAAQS alone would be inadequate to protect na-
tional parks because it is designed to protect the entire country, not the most pristine areas. On
the other hand, the public choice account suggests that members of Congress from nonattain-
ment states wanted to impose an additional burden on those states that complied with the
NAAQS. See B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being
Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551, 553 (1985).
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They do not control the emission of air pollutants other than those
six.
Even for the regulated pollutants, ambient standards may not
constrain environmental risk. The NAAQS regulate each criteria
pollutant individually, rather than taking into account the cumulative
effect produced by the combination of all regulated pollutants. Each
of the six criteria pollutants in a given region can be very close to the
statutory maximum without actually violating the regulatory stan-
dards. Thus, it is possible that environmental risk levels will be unac-
ceptable even for the six regulated pollutants.
III.  EMPIRICAL UNDERINCLUSIVENESS
Part II demonstrates that as a theoretical matter, our current
regulatory system is both underinclusive and overinclusive with re-
spect to the rights-based justification. This Part extends that analysis
by showing that the regulatory system’s underinclusiveness is signifi-
cant in practice. Despite the presence of federal regulations, many
communities are exposed to high levels of pollution that result in both
a contaminated environment and consequent harms to human health.
Part III.A explains that it is difficult to determine the exact
amount of cumulative environmental risk that exists in various com-
munities. Despite the quantification problems, however, it is evident
that certain communities experience disproportionately high levels of
environmental risk under the present system. One such community—
Chester, Pennsylvania—is examined in Part III.B.
A. Quantification Problems
Quantifying the cumulative health risks that different communi-
ties face is difficult because there is a paucity of data, and several fac-
tors make the existing data unreliable as an indicator of risk. No na-
tional database reports on the cumulative pollution risks that
different communities face. Prominent among the databases that
could potentially be used as a tool for assessing risks to the public
health is the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).162 TRI requires compa-
162. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994). TRI was mandated as a part of EPCRA. For more on
EPCRA, see the text accompanying notes 108-111, supra.
Some recently-developed databases may be qualitatively superior to TRI for measuring
cumulative risks. See Telephone Interview with Michael Callahan, Chair, Technical Panel Pre-
paring the Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter Callahan In-
terview]. One database that Callahan specifically mentions is the National-Scale Air Toxics As-
sessment. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment,
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nies with ten or more full-time employees that are engaged in manu-
facturing, processing or otherwise using more than a threshold quan-
tity of listed chemicals to file standardized forms with the EPA dis-
closing their annual releases.163 The information supplied is compiled
in the TRI, and has been available to the public through a national
computerized database. However, a number of shortcomings prevent
TRI from effectively measuring cumulative environmental risks.
First, all TRI releases are measured uniformly in pounds regard-
less of toxicity.164 However, TRI-listed chemicals are far from uniform
in their toxicity: In fact, the toxicity of TRI-listed chemicals can vary
more than 10,000-fold.165 Thus, a firm might reduce its TRI-reported
emissions even while increasing ecological risk through the substitu-
tion of lower-volume pollutants that are higher in toxicity.166 Alexan-
der Volokh provides an illustration of how this could occur:
[S]uppose a facility released 1,000,000 pounds of methanol to a
wastewater-treatment facility and also had 1,000 pounds of fugitive
air releases of perchloroethylene. Also suppose that the methanol
was effectively degraded with virtually no residue. The facility’s to-
tal releases would be 1,001,000 pounds. Suppose that the next year,
the facility made changes resulting in only 500,000 pounds of
methanol releases, but fugitive emissions of perchloroethylene in-
creased to 5,000 pounds. Total releases would show a decline from
1,001,000 pounds to 505,000 pounds—“clearly” an improvement.
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata (last visited June 29, 2003). However, although the National-
Scale Air Toxics Assessment appears to be a promising tool for estimating environmental risks
related to the pollutants that it covers, the database encompasses only thirty-three air pollut-
ants. See id.
The EPA also relatively recently created the Sector Facility Indexing Project (SFIP), "a
web-accessible database that combines TRI data with other data already available to the
agency, including air, water, and RCRA compliance history and reported chemical spills for ap-
proximately 640 facilities in five industry sectors." Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 357; see also
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA, Sector Facility Indexing Project
Home Page, available at http://www.epa.gov/oeca/sfi/ (last visited June 29, 2003). Also, the EPA
is "attempting to standardize, streamline, and consolidate all environmental reporting into a
single, unified database," under the Reinventing Environmental Information (REI) initiative.
Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 358. This database is expected to be more complete than SFIP. Id.
at 358-59. Yet even this database falls short of being a full-scale pollution release and transfer
registry because, "[a]part from TRI, reporting is limited to those substances for which reporting
is required under conventional regulatory statutes." Id. at 359.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994).
164. ANDERSON & LOHOF, supra note 110, at 9-5 ("Releases are not weighted according to
toxicity . . . .").
165. Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Environmental Right-to-Know, 2 UTAH L. REV.
805, 820 (2002) ("Releasing twenty million pounds of acetone to the air is much less harmful
than similarly emitting 1000 pounds of phosgene gas.").
166. Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 332.
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But since perchloroethylene is a suspected carcinogen while
methanol is far less dangerous, potential risks from the facility’s
releases are greater in the second year, perhaps by several orders of
magnitude.167
Although the evidence seems to indicate that few firms “game” their
TRI data in this manner,168 the fact that they can do so indicates a
fundamental obstacle to using TRI data to determine cumulative en-
vironmental risks.
Second, TRI data is incomplete in two regards. Initially, because
TRI only measures toxic releases, “[a] firm with superior TRI data
might nonetheless produce large volumes of conventional pollutants
or solid waste.”169 Conventional pollutants—such as particulate mat-
ter, sulfur dioxides, and carbon monoxide—can have a significant ef-
fect on human health and the environment.170 Since TRI does not
167. Volokh, supra note 165, at 820.
168. Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 332.
169. Id. at 331.
170. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environ-
mental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 463, 526 n.321 (1989) (noting that particulate matter, sulfur
dioxides and carbon monoxide are all conventional pollutants).
High fine particulate matter concentrations are known to threaten human health. EPA Of-
fice of Air and Radiation, Latest Findings on National Air Quality: 2000 Status and Trends—
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) (Sept. 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd00/nitrodox.html; see
also NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BREATH TAKING: PREMATURE MORTALITY
DUE TO PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION IN 239 CITIES 1 (1996) (claiming that particulate
pollution causes 64,000 premature deaths every year by hastening heart and lung disease);
PARTICLES IN OUR AIR: CONCENTRATIONS AND HEALTH EFFECTS (Richard Wilson & John
D. Spengler eds., 1996) (collecting ten essays that examine the health effects of airborne
particulate matter). It is widely believed that in London's "Killer Fog" of 1952, extremely high
particulate matter levels "led to 4,000 excess deaths in a week." Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,
175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing W.P.D. Logan, Mortality in the London Fog
Incident, 1952, LANCET, Feb. 4, 1953, at 336-38), modified on petition for reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
High sulfur dioxide concentrations can exacerbate asthma and heart and lung disease. EPA
Office of Air and Radiation, Latest Findings on National Air Quality: 2000 Status and Trends—
Sulfur Dioxide (Sept. 2001), at http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd00/sulfur.html (noting that short-
term exposures to sulfur dioxide can impair asthmatic individuals, while longer term exposures
can produce "respiratory illness, alterations in the lungs' defenses, and aggravation of existing
cardiovascular disease"); New York State Dep't Envtl. Conservation, 1996 Air Quality Report,
at http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dar/reports/96annrpt/96ar_maj.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2003) ("Human exposure to sulfur dioxide can result in irritation of the respiratory system
which can cause both temporary and permanent damage."). Sulfur dioxide is also a major factor
in the production of acid rain. OFFICE OF ACID DEPOSITION, ENVTL. MONITORING, AND
QUALITY ASSURANCE, EPA, THE ACIDIC DEPOSITION PHENOMENON AND ITS EFFECTS:
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT 3, 9-10 (Aug. 1985).
Carbon monoxide can enter the bloodstream and weaken heart contractions. New York
State Dep't Envtl. Conservation, supra. In some instances, "[e]xposure to carbon monoxide can
be fatal." Ellis B. Murov, Comment, Environmental Law: Attaining and Maintaining Air Quality
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measure these conventional releases, its data does not account for a
significant component of the environmental risks that communities
experience.
Moreover, TRI’s data for toxic releases is also incomplete. This
data is incomplete in part because TRI does not list chemicals that
“are not used in large enough quantities to justify the additional re-
porting burden.”171 This creates an incentive for firms to use non-
listed chemicals in place of listed chemicals. However, much of this
substitution may simply replace one toxic substance with another.172
And “[e]ven if a substitute chemical is less toxic, it may be more vola-
tile, be more easily absorbed, or otherwise create greater exposure
and greater risk than the original, listed chemical.”173 The toxics data
is also incomplete because the basic information needed to determine
whether a significant number of toxic pollutants should be listed in
TRI is lacking. The EPA has acknowledged that it lacks “the basic in-
formation needed to determine whether [the majority of the highest-
volume organic chemicals] should be listed on the TRI.”174 A 1994
GAO study reported that only about 320 of over 70,000 chemicals in
commercial use in the country are included in the database.175 One
consequence of TRI’s incomplete toxic release data, the GAO study
concludes, is that “companies may maintain or even increase their us-
age of toxic chemicals while concurrently reducing the chemicals that
are reported to EPA.”176 Because the non-listed chemicals dwarf
those that are included, TRI provides only a small snapshot of the
whole range of pollution risks that any community faces.177 A final
reason that TRI’s toxics data is incomplete is because its coverage of
facilities is not comprehensive. Firms are only required to report their
data if they have ten or more employees, are in specified Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, and either use 10,000 pounds or
import, manufacture or process 25,000 pounds of a listed chemical.178
Standards Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 53 TUL. L. REV. 907, 908 n.9 (1979).
171. Volokh, supra note 165, at 837; see also Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 334.
172. Volokh, supra note 165, at 837.
173. Id.
174. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, EPA, WHAT DO WE REALLY
KNOW ABOUT THE SAFETY OF HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICALS? EPA'S BASELINE
OF HAZARD INFORMATION THAT IS READILY AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC 8 (1998).
175. See ANDERSON & LOHOF, supra note 110, at 9-3 (describing the GAO study).
176. Quoted in id.
177. See Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 334 (stating that TRI's picture of health and envi-
ronmental risks is "radically underinclusive").
178. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b), (f).
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In 1988, the EPA estimated that this ten-employee requirement ex-
empted 48 percent of the manufacturing facilities in the specified SIC
codes from reporting their data to TRI.179 As a result “TRI captures
only a small percent of actual releases and transfers.”180
Third, TRI pays insufficient attention to factors relevant to cali-
brating the actual effect of pollutants on human health. Failure to ac-
count for “proximity to population, exposure route, dispersion, per-
sistence, [and] sensitivity of exposed populations” makes an
extrapolation of TRI data to the risks posed to human health ex-
tremely difficult.181 TRI released a National Report in 1991 which ad-
mitted as much when it stated that the report “contain[ed] aggregate
information . . . which alone does not indicate the risk these chemicals
pose to human health or to the environment.”182 Thus, rather than
serving as a proxy for cumulative risks, TRI data only serves as “an
indicator of the environmental performance of a limited class of
sources.”183
A fourth problem with TRI is that, even as an incomplete indica-
tor of “the environmental performance of a limited class of sources,”
TRI’s data quality is suspect. Although TRI reports that toxic re-
leases have been in steady decline since 1988,184 the EPA notes that
such changes may not be attributable to actual reductions in toxic
emissions, but rather they may be caused by “errors, changes in facili-
ties’ estimation or calculation techniques, changes in reporting guid-
ance and facilities’ interpretation of that guidance, and facilities’ use
of exemptions.”185 The EPA has not issued guidelines for the data re-
179. Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-to-Know, 53 Fed. Reg. 4500,
4523 (Feb. 16, 1988).
180. THOMAS A. BURKE & NADIA M. SHALAUTA, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, PILOT MULTI-MEDIA HEALTH CHARACTERIZATION STUDY OF SOUTH
AND SOUTHWEST PHILADELPHIA E-12 (1997).
181. Id.; see also ANDERSON & LOHOF, supra note 110, at 9-5 (noting that TRI data does
not take into account "the dangers posed by various methods of disposing of various types of
chemicals and do[es] not indicate exposure or potential effects on human health and the envi-
ronment"); David Abell, Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know: The Toxics Re-
lease Inventory, 47 SMU L. REV. 581, 596 (1994); Jennifer Lukas Jackson, Note, Environmental
Audit Privilege Laws: Stripping the Public's Right to Know, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539, 549
(2001) ("[T]he TRI data does not reflect the public's exposure to those chemicals and is not suf-
ficient to calculate potential adverse health effects.").
182. EPA OFFICE OF PESTICIDES & TOXIC SUBSTANCES, TOXICS IN THE COMMUNITY:
NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES, THE 1989 TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY NATIONAL
REPORT, EPA/560/4-91-014, at 19-20 (1991).
183. Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 333.
184. Volokh, supra note 165, at 815.
185. ANDERSON & LOHOF, supra note 110, at 9-3.
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ported to TRI, and firms can thus reduce their reported emissions by
altering the techniques they employ in their estimates.186 The prob-
ability that reported decreases will not reflect actual reductions is
magnified by the fact that “[n]either the EPA nor the states are re-
quired to check the self-reported numbers.”187
It is true that the EPA is trying to develop its research methods
and capabilities. One commentator has noted that research on the ef-
fects of pollution has become increasingly sophisticated, and scientists
“are increasingly able to measure the synergistic and cumulative ef-
fects of routine exposures.”188 Yet despite improvements in the EPA’s
ability to measure environmental risks, at present cumulative risks
cannot be effectively measured. Professor Kakkainen has noted that
throughout the field of environmental regulation, “no consideration is
given to the problem of co-causation—the synergistic, interactive, or
cumulative effects of multiple toxic pollutants.”189 The EPA has ad-
mitted to shortcomings in both its data and methods of analysis:
The ability to assess environmental risks, compare them, and select
strategies to reduce them all depend on the availability and sophis-
tication of the relevant data and analytical tools. The weakness in [a
1987 EPA publication] stems in large part from the weakness of the
data and analytical tools used, and those weaknesses still exist. If
EPA’s efforts to assess, compare, and reduce risks are to improve
in the future, the data and analytical tools must improve as well.190
In a similar vein, Reginald Harris, who led the group of scientists
that assembled the protocol for a cumulative risk study in Chester,
186. Id.
187. Volokh, supra note 165, at 815.
188. Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism":
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 168 (1996); see also Telephone Inter-
view with Reginald Harris, Senior Toxicologist and Environmental Justice Coordinator, EPA's
Region III (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Harris Interview] ("The data gathering is definitely better.
It gets better all the time, and our understanding of how data can be used gets better over
time.").
189. Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 334.
190. U.S. EPA, REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 18 (1990); see also Steinzor, supra note 188, at 168 (stating that
"there is still an enormous research agenda left to accomplish.").
The EPA has also acknowledged this shortcoming in two recent colloquia designed to im-
prove the process of determining cumulative risks by establishing a framework for their evalua-
tion. EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY
OF THE U.S. EPA COLLOQUIUM ON A FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT:
COLLOQUIUM #1 (1997); EASTERN RESEARCH GROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, SUMMARY OF THE U.S. EPA COLLOQUIUM ON A FRAMEWORK FOR HUMAN
HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT: COLLOQUIUM #2 (1998); see also Callahan Interview, supra note
162 ("The framework is the first step in a much longer process.").
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Pennsylvania,191 reports that the Chester study was limited by the in-
complete data sets that they employed.192 Because of the data’s limita-
tions, the team was often forced to model information based on the
best data available.193 Harris doubts that a truly comprehensive data-
base will ever be created, because “people would be collecting data
forever” if that degree of research were attempted.194
Thus, at present, neither TRI nor the EPA’s other databases can
be used to effectively estimate cumulative environmental risks. In-
deed, most of the EPA’s databases were not designed with cumula-
tive risk estimates as a major goal.195 This point is illustrated in a re-
cent risk assessment study of the South and Southwest Philadelphia
area. The study states that although a “tremendous volume” of data
on environmental quality was available, “there is little information
available on the actual exposure levels of urban residents to pollut-
ants in their environment.”196 In fact, the study states that, after con-
ducting an extensive search, the research team found “virtually no
available measurements of individual exposures in the Study Area.”197
B. Chester, Pennsylvania Case Study
Despite problems with the EPA’s data, there is enough informa-
tion to know that certain communities are subjected to high levels of
environmental risk despite the existence of federal regulations. This
disparity in environmental risk levels vividly illustrates that the regu-
latory system is underinclusive with respect to the rights-based justifi-
cation. This Section discusses Chester, Pennsylvania as a case study. I
selected Chester to illustrate the regulatory system’s underinclusive-
ness because the EPA has produced an excellent environmental risk
study for Chester. Since studies that attempt to measure cumulative
risks are rare, it seemed ideal to use an area for which a competent
study has been performed.
191. See infra Part III.B (describing the Chester study).
192. Harris Interview, supra note 188.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Callahan Interview, supra note 162. Callahan states that data would have been
compiled in a much different manner if cumulative risk analysis had been one of the purposes
behind TRI. Id. ("You'd have more chemical-by-chemical breakdowns; rather than a facility-by-
facility release number you would have it broken down unit-by-unit within the facility.").
196. BURKE & SHALAUTA, supra note 180, at E-12.
197. Id.
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Chester is regularly cited in the academic literature as an exam-
ple of environmental racism.198 Chester is an urban city of approxi-
mately 42,000 residents located about fifteen miles southwest of
Philadelphia along the Delaware River,199 and its population is around
65% African-American.200 A large number of commercial waste facili-
ties are located in Chester: Of the seven permits for commercial waste
facilities that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protec-
tion issued between 1986 and 1996, five were in Chester.201 Beyond
that, “over 60% of the waste-processing industries in Delaware
County are located in Chester.”202
Prompted by the high concentration of waste facilities in Chester,
the EPA undertook an extensive study of the city, which was released
in the fall of 1994. The study examined six different kinds of envi-
ronmental risks that have a direct impact on human health.203 The re-
sults indicate that there are high levels of pollution in multiple media
that seemingly present a great level of environmental risk. This is the
archetypal situation in which the regulatory system will be unable to
safeguard citizens’ environmental rights, because numerous pollut-
ants in multiple media pose a considerable risk to the public health,
yet no federal statutes have been violated.204 As Reginald Harris re-
ports, “the facilities [in Chester] seem to be operating pretty much
within their permits.”205
The Chester study first examined groundwater and drinking wa-
ter. It found that a number of anthropogenic hazardous waste sources
198. See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 12, at 34 ("The story of Chester, Pennsylvania, is
in many ways a classic case of environmental racism . . . ."); Jerome Balter, The EPA Needs a
Workable Environmental Justice Protocol, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 357, 357 (1999); Sheila Foster,
Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transforma-
tive Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 778 (1998).
199. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
STUDY FOR CITY OF CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA 1 (Draft Report, May 1995) [hereinafter
CHESTER STUDY].
200. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (3d Cir.
1997), dismissed as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998) ("The City of Chester is located in Delaware
County, Pennsylvania, and has a population of approximately 42,000, of which 65% is black and
32% is white."). Chester's demographics can be contrasted with those of Delaware County,
where Chester is located. Excluding Chester, Delaware County's population is 6.2% black and
91% white. Id.
201. Foster, supra note 198, at 779-80.
202. Id. at 780.
203. It also examined foul odors and noise pollution in the Chester area. CHESTER STUDY,
supra note 199, at 63-68.
204. See CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, Part II.
205. Harris Interview, supra note 188.
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polluted Chester’s groundwater.206 The groundwater contained
“[s]ignificant levels of organic and inorganic contaminants,” and ap-
peared to be highly contaminated.207 The study also identified three
major pollutants in the drinking water that could affect human health.
First, a number of trihalomethanes exceeded their risk-based concen-
trations (RBCs).208 Second, the study found positive coliform results
in several samples of the drinking water supply between 1989 and
1993.209 Finally, although exposure to volatile organic compounds in
the drinking water was not expected to increase overall cancer or
non-cancer risk, the study found that carbon tetrachloride and tetra-
chloroethene exceeded their RBCs.210
Second, the study explored lead pollution, to which humans can
be exposed by inhalation, ingestion with food, drinking water, soil
and house dust, or through exposure when it crosses the placenta.211
The study found that ambient levels of lead did not violate national
standards.212 Despite this, blood analysis indicated that “lead intake
among area children may exceed national averages by about 130
ug/day.”213 Even at low levels of lead exposure, “lead poisoning causes
intelligence quotient deficiencies, reading and learning disabilities,
impaired hearing, reduced attention span, hyperactivity, behavior
problems, and interference with growth.”214 The health effects are
greater at high levels of exposure: High exposure levels can result in
blindness, brain damage, cancer, and even death.215
Third, the study examined potential hazardous waste sites under
CERCLA and the Superfund Reauthorization Amendments Act, as
well as RCRA Treatment, Storage and Disposal facilities (TSDFs).
206. CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, at 21.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 22. The RBCs represent "the chemical concentrations that would correspond to
the lower end of the target screening risk range . . . ." Id. at 6. They "are compared to the site
data during the data evaluation stage to rule out chemicals that will not contribute significantly
to risks at the site." Id.
209. Id. at 24.
210. Id. at 26.
211. Id. at 33.
212. Id. at 36.
213. Id. at 37.
214. Jennifer L. Bush, Comment, The Federal Lead Poisoning Prevention Program: Inade-
quate Guidance for an Expeditious Solution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 645, 647 (1996).
215. Id. at 647-48; see also William G. Kelly, Comment, Ericka and Myron: Canaries in the
Mines, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 173, 175 (2002); Amy E. Souchuns, Comment, Old Pain, New
Laws: Achieving Effective Compliance With the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction
Act, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1411, 1414 (1998).
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Under CERCLA, the study found four sources in the Chester area
that produced “unacceptable” hazardous waste risks.216 In particular,
there were “several instances” of soil contamination.217 A number of
pollutants of potential concern surrounded the TSDFs, including lead
and other metals in soil, arsenic and phenanthrene in the soil, and as-
bestos and toluene in the air.218
Fourth, the study examined surface water, sediment and fish tis-
sue. Since researchers had observed people fishing in the Delaware
River in September, exposure to contaminants in fish through either
occasional or subsistence fishing seemed possible.219 At one site, the
study found cancer risk “based on arsenic and beryllium in a drainage
ditch water sample.”220 It also found cancer risks at four other sites,
based on such pollutants as arsenic, polycylic aromatic hydrocarbons,
and beryllium.221 The study also found “risks associated with . . . con-
sumption” of locally-caught fish due to the presence of such pollut-
ants as chlordane, DDT, and mercury.222 The EPA believes that the
bioaccumulation of mercury in fish can threaten both human health
and wildlife.223
Fifth, the study examined TRI data regarding local toxic releases.
It discussed six local facilities that released a variety of toxic pollut-
ants, including ethylene oxide, benzene, chloroform, hydrochloric
acid and sulfuric acid.224 Particularly instructive in this section of the
study is a discussion of the problems encountered in attempting to ex-
trapolate environmental risks from the TRI data: The study notes
that “the proximity of [the TRI] releases relative to potentially ex-
posed populations has not been established. The determination of a
potential health threat of the volumes released depends on the
216. CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, at 43.
217. Id. at 42.
218. Id. at 40.
219. Id. at 46.
220. Id. at 47. However, it was unclear to the authors of the study whether people actually
swam in the ditch. Id.
221. Id. at 47-48.
222. Id. at 48.
223. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,827 (Dec. 20, 2000); see also U.S. EPA, TOXICS
IN THE COMMUNITY, NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 272-73 (1991) (finding that severe
mercury poisoning may produce irreversible brain damage).
224. CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, at 52-54.
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proximity of the stack to residential areas, the surrounding terrain
and the meteorological conditions.”225
The sixth and final medium that the study covered was air pollu-
tion. Although there were no NAAQS violations, the study con-
cluded that “several chemicals were predicted to exist in air at con-
centrations of potential concern.”226 As a result, “[c]umulative
carcinogenic and non-cancer threats are predicted to exceed bench-
marks at several locations in Chester City.”227
An EPA Region III official has noted that the Chester study
does not measure complete cumulative risks; instead, it is “more of an
aggregated risk study because there is an unknown nature of interre-
lated exposures.”228 Although the study was not able to measure such
potentially synergistic effects, it was nonetheless able to conclude that
“[b]oth cancer and non-cancer risks from the pollution sources at lo-
cations in the city of Chester exceed levels which the USEPA believes
are acceptable.”229 Despite the EPA’s conclusion that aggregate envi-
ronmental risk levels emanating from pollution sources in and around
the city of Chester are unacceptable, the relevant facilities have com-
plied with their permit requirements and no regulatory standards ap-
pear to have been violated.230 Chester thus illustrates the fact that the
regulatory system is underinclusive with respect to the rights-based
justification.
Aside from Chester, a number of other areas are reputed to have
high levels of environmental risk, and may also demonstrate the
regulatory system’s underinclusiveness. One example is the eighty-
five-mile stretch in Louisiana popularly known as “Cancer Alley.”231
The waterways that run through this area have had a large amount of
225. Id. at 52. This observation obviously bolsters my conclusion in Part III.A that it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine environmental risk from TRI data.
226. CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, at 56.
227. Id.
228. Samantha P. Fairchild, Environmental Justice: An Overview, 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. 111, 119 (2000).
229. CHESTER STUDY, supra note 199, at 2. A number of commentators noted the EPA's
conclusion. See, e.g., Fairchild, supra note 228, at 119; Foster, supra note 198, at 782; Valerie P.
Mahoney, Note, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories to Complete Solutions, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1999).
230. See Harris Interview, supra note 205 and accompanying text.
231. See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tu-
lane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33, 38-39 (2000); Rachel Brasso Ra-
zon, Comment, What is Good for the Market, Can be Bad for the Health: Emissions Trading Un-
der SCAQMD's Rule 1610 and the Unjust Environmental Effects, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
539, 545 (1999).
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toxics dumped into them, and air pollution also seems to be perva-
sive.232 A study performed by an Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights found that the communities along “Can-
cer Alley” faced disproportionate environmental risk from the “per-
mitting and expansion of hazardous waste and chemical facilities.”233
These pollution levels have reportedly caused residents a number of
health problems.234 Another example is the industrial area in the south
side of Chicago popularly known as the “Toxic Doughnut.”235 The
“Toxic Doughnut” is essentially a 140-square-mile ring comprised of
“a chemical incinerator, a water and sewage treatment facility, steel
mills, paint factories, scrap yards and at least 52 landfills.”236 This high
concentration of polluters has reportedly caused both a high level of
232. J. Michael Kennedy, Danger in Louisiana's "Cancer Alley", L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1989,
at 1 (explaining that in 1987, according to data that the chemical industry submitted to the EPA,
"774 million pounds of toxics were dumped into Louisiana's waterways" and "another 134 mil-
lion pounds of toxics were released into the air"). After visiting "Cancer Alley," one journalist
wrote that "the catfish tasted oily, the river shrimp had vanished and, at night, acrid odors drove
people inside off their porches." Mary T. Schmich, "Chemical Soup" of Mississippi River Wor-
ries Residents, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 20, 1988, at A12.
233. LOUISIANA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE BATTLE
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA . . . GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRY, AND THE
PEOPLE 63 (1993).
234. For example, it has been reported that residents within one mile of the Borden plant
"have a 4.5% greater chance of contracting lung cancer than those living one to three miles
away." Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate
Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 211, 230 n.80 (1994). For a critique of the environmental justice literature discussing
"Cancer Alley," see CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 75-76 (1998) ("The current scientific consensus is that behavioral
and some occupational factors have been associated with cancer incidence in Louisiana, but that
there is no overall 'cancer epidemic' in that state or in the so-called cancer alley.").
Bunyan Bryant has argued that "Cancer Alley" demonstrates how the regulatory system
overlooks cumulative environmental risk:
[I]n cancer alley you have all of the corporations each dumping hundreds and thou-
sands of pounds of chemicals into the air and the water and the EPA and the State
government issuing permits as if that is the only company that is doing it. There's no
concern about the cumulative effect.
Environmental Protection Agency Cabinet Elevation—Environmental Equity Issues: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 103d Cong. 96 (statement of Bunyan Bryant).
235. See James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Com-
munity Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 549
(1994); Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 75, at 66.
236. Natalie M. Hammer, Title VI as a Means of Achieving Environmental Justice, 16 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 693, 693 (1996); see also Heather M. Little, Toxin Shock, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1995, at
3. A total of 100 factories and 103 abandoned waste dumpsites are located in south side minority
communities. Robert P. Bullard, Environmental Justice: A New Framework for Action, ENVTL.
L. NEWS, Spring 1996, at 14-15, 18.
032204 GARTENSTEIN-ROSS.DOC 04/26/04  10:57 AM
230 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 14.1
environmental risk in south side Chicago and extensive soil and
groundwater contamination.237 A number of other communities are
also known for having disproportionately high levels of environ-
mental risk.238
IV.  IMPLICATIONS
Earlier, I outlined two basic regulatory principles that seem logi-
cally compelled if the rights-based justification is seen as a valid rea-
son for federal intervention. First, I stated that the regulatory system
should effectively guarantee citizens’ environmental rights. However,
I also explained that the justification becomes far less persuasive
when used to support regulations that are only marginally related to
it.
The previous two Parts demonstrate that the regulatory system is
underinclusive because it fails to effectively guarantee citizens’ envi-
ronmental rights, but is simultaneously overinclusive because it ap-
plies even in areas where aggregate pollution levels are low enough
that citizens’ environmental rights are not violated. Thus, the rights-
based justification does not provide strong support for the present
regulatory system.
Of course, there are a few individual regulations under the pres-
ent system for which the rights-based justification does provide strong
support. These regulations fall under the third rationale for the rights-
based justification: They are designed to ameliorate discrimination in
the placement of environmental risk. The best-known of these regula-
tions is Executive Order 12,898, which President Clinton issued in
1994.239 That Executive Order requires federal agencies to incorporate
environmental justice concerns into their missions by addressing the
disproportionate environmental impact of the agencies’ operations on
minority and low-income populations.240 The Executive Order also
creates an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice,
which is designed to assist federal agencies in identifying dispropor-
tionate environmental effects on minority and low-income popula-
237. Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771-73 (1994).
238. It has been noted that "[c]ertain neighborhoods have become notorious among envi-
ronmental justice activists and in the media as toxic battlegrounds due to high concentrations of
polluting facilities." Freeman & Godsil, supra note 235, at 549. These neighborhoods include
South Central and East Los Angeles, and West Harlem and the South Bronx in New York City.
Id. at 549.
239. See Exec. Order No. 12,989, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
240. Id.
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tions, and to help the agencies develop strategies to address these en-
vironmental justice concerns.241 Moreover, the Executive Order
touches upon research, data collection and analysis relevant to envi-
ronmental justice concerns. The Order requires, inter alia, that envi-
ronmental health research include diverse segments of the population
in epidemiological and clinical studies, that environmental health
analyses “identify multiple and cumulative exposures” where practi-
cable, and that each federal agency collect and analyze information
“assessing and comparing environmental and human health risks
borne by population identified by race, national origin, or income.”242
The rights-based justification provides strong support for Execu-
tive Order 12,898 because, although the Executive Order does not
prevent discrimination in the placement of environmental risk, it is
designed to appreciably reduce environmental risks that fall dispro-
portionately on minorities and the poor. Moreover, the Executive
Order is not overinclusive with respect to the rights-based justifica-
tion. Thus, the Executive Order’s fit to the rights-based justification is
better than that of most environmental regulations.243
However, the strong fit between Executive Order 12,898 and the
rights-based justification is the exception, rather than the rule. The
regulatory system generally has major underinclusiveness and overin-
clusiveness problems with respect to the rights-based justification,
and thus the justification does not provide strong support for the
regulatory system as a whole.
This discontinuity between the rights-based justification and the
bulk of federal regulations is significant because an alternative exists
that can effectively guarantee citizens’ environmental rights while
avoiding the major overinclusiveness problems inherent to the pres-
ent regulatory system. Insofar as the rationale for federal regulation is
grounded in the rights of citizens, these rights can be protected
through flexible, cost-effective direct regulation of the cumulative
levels of environmental risk to which citizens and communities can be
exposed.244 This cumulative risk-based regulation is better supported
241. Id. at 7629-30.
242. Id. at 7631.
243. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
244. Although policymakers could attempt to address the regulatory system's underinclu-
siveness problems by increasing the stringency of existing regulations across the board, such an
approach would not solve the problems described in this Article. Making all regulations more
stringent would obviously greatly increase the regulatory system's problems of overinclusiveness
with respect to the rights-based justification. Moreover, increasing the stringency of all regula-
tions would not necessarily safeguard citizens' environmental rights: The regulatory system
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by the rights-based justification than is the present system. Flexible
direct regulation of cumulative risk levels would effectively guarantee
whatever level of freedom from environmental risk that policymakers
believe the federal government should provide; consistent with the
principle of proportionality in regulation, it would be the least restric-
tive way to safeguard these environmental rights, and would be nei-
ther disproportionate nor excessive.245 I will first discuss how such a
layer of direct regulation of cumulative risks could be implemented,
and then provide two examples of similarly flexible, cost-minimizing
regulations.
A. Implementation
A layer of regulation geared at controlling environmental risk
levels would be similar to ambient standards in that it would function
on a region-by-region basis. However, instead of addressing environ-
mental risk in a pollutant-by-pollutant manner, this risk-based stan-
dard would directly regulate cumulative risk levels. After a maximum
level of environmental risk that local pollution levels should not ex-
ceed has been established, the EPA would monitor the regulated re-
gions and enforce the cumulative risk standard.
Such a layer of regulation could be precisely tailored to what
policymakers consider to be the minimal level of protection from en-
vironmental risk that the federal government should provide. It
would thus obviate the need for any further federal regulation de-
signed to protect citizens’ rights; that is, if this layer of cumulative
risk-based regulation provided the minimal level of freedom from en-
vironmental risk that policymakers believe the federal government
should provide, then insofar as further federal regulation is justified
thereafter, it must be justified by economic, rather than rights-based,
rationales for federal intervention.
Of course, before the EPA could effectively monitor risk levels
and enforce this regulation, the agency would have to ameliorate at
least some of the informational problems discussed above.246 There
are two major ways that the data gaps could be addressed: a focus on
improving the quality of data, and development of consistent formu-
lae that can be utilized for the estimation of cumulative risks. In re-
gard to the first of these options, the EPA could strive to create a da-
would still be composed of firm-by-firm, pollutant-by-pollutant, and medium-by-medium envi-
ronmental standards that do not provide a constraint on aggregate levels of environmental risk.
245. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
246. See supra Part III.A.
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tabase that can account for the environmental risks of pollutants
across different media, which would possess the capacity to determine
which communities have complied with the cumulative risk standard.
Recently, the EPA has made some positive strides toward the meas-
urement of cumulative risks. One such positive development is the
National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment, which has the explicit purpose
of “[c]haracterizing potential public health risk due to inhalation of
air toxics including both cancer and non-cancer effects.”247 The EPA
could expedite similar improvements in data quality by devoting
more resources to such projects. The EPA can also improve its data
quality by creating reporting requirements that fill in obvious data
gaps that would otherwise hamper an extrapolation to cumulative en-
vironmental risks. In the case of TRI, for example, the EPA could
develop reporting requirements that at least approximate different
factors that are determinative of health effects, such as the proximity
to population and exposure routes.248 In regard to the second of these
options, the EPA can create formulae for estimating cumulative risks.
Although such formulae will of necessity rely on estimates, the key
consideration is that the agency create a uniform and objective
method of estimating risks in order to facilitate direct regulation of
cumulative risk levels.249
After a risk-based regulatory standard has been created, and af-
ter the EPA has developed its methods of measuring cumulative
risks, the agency would monitor risk levels within the regulated re-
gions to determine when a region has fallen into non-compliance. If
the agency found that cumulative environmental risk levels in a cer-
tain region exceeded the regulatory maximum, the EPA would order
pollution reductions sufficient to bring that area into compliance. Af-
ter the agency has ordered the initial reduction in environmental risk,
firms’ new permissible emission levels either could be grandfathered,
based on each firm’s historical emission levels, or else allocated
through an auction. In other regulatory contexts, the latter option ap-
pears to make for better policy because it presents less barriers for
247. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 162. There have also been other
positive developments, such as the EPA's creation of publicly accessible databases that combine
TRI data with other data available to the agency. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
249. Cf. William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH.,
Spring 1985, at 19 (arguing that risk assessment should employ a neutral process of evaluation).
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new entrants to a market, but the former option has been more politi-
cally feasible.250
Regardless of how the initial reduction in environmental risk is
allocated, after it takes place the agency could employ a system of lo-
calized tradable permits to maintain acceptable levels of environ-
mental risk.251 The EPA would determine the appropriate size of rele-
vant trading regions, and would only allow intra-region trades: Inter-
region trading would interrupt any region’s ability to safeguard its
citizens’ environmental rights. The trading regions for a permit sys-
tem that is designed to safeguard citizens’ environmental rights would
necessarily be small in scope: Larger trading regions could potentially
result in pollution “hot spots” that would violate environmental
rights.252 A system of localized cumulative risk-based trading would
efficiently allocate the costs of pollution reduction, in that such costs
would fall on those firms that could reduce environmental risks at the
lowest expense.253 If costs of pollution reduction were particularly
high for a given firm, it could purchase permits from another firm
whose reduction costs were lower.254 One of the EPA’s major con-
cerns in administering such a program should be that cumulative risk
levels are controlled in as flexible and efficient a manner as possible.
B. Regulatory Flexibility
The current environmental regime includes several examples of
flexible, cost-minimizing regulation similar to the layer of regulation
geared at controlling environmental risk levels that this Article dis-
250. See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environ-
mental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 315-17 & n.19 (1998); but see Jonathan Remy
Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter
Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 507 (2000) ("Although auction-based initial
allocations of emissions allowances may seem unlikely to become reality in the near future,
there is some empirical evidence to the contrary.").
251. See Keohane et al., supra note 250, at 316; Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for
Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 293, 306 (1997); Evan Goldenberg, Comment, The Design of an Emissions Permit
Market for RECLAIM: A Holistic Approach, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 297, 302 (1993).
252. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A
Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 373 (1999).
253. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Design-
ing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q.
569, 617 (2001) (noting that "lowest-cost reduction of pollution to the desired level" is "one of
the primary promises of tradable permit schemes").
254. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); W. David
Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON.
THEORY 395 (1972).
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cusses. Two examples are the EPA’s Project XL, and the Endangered
Species Act’s (ESA) Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). I will dis-
cuss, in turn, how both regulatory programs demonstrate the viability
of regulatory flexibility.
1. Project XL
The EPA introduced Project XL, which stands for eXcellence
and Leadership, in May 1995. Project XL was a response to a docu-
ment that President Clinton had issued that March entitled Rein-
venting Environmental Regulation, which directed the EPA to “im-
plement pilot programs to develop innovative alternatives to the
current regulatory system.”255 The first sentence of EPA’s Project XL
announcement stated that the fundamental purpose of Project XL
was to “give regulated sources the flexibility to develop alternative
strategies that will replace or modify specific regulatory requirements
on the condition that they produce greater environmental benefits.”256
Project XL is particularly relevant in the context of the rights-based
justification because of its promise to combine greater flexibility and
efficiency with firms’ ability to “produce greater environmental bene-
fits.” This combination of results and efficiency is necessary for a risk-
based environmental standard that minimizes its burden on industry.
When introduced in May 1995, Project XL featured programs
targeted at individual facilities, industry sectors, and government
agencies.257 In November, an XL program targeting communities was
added.258 Through Project XL, the EPA told regulated parties that “if
you have an idea that offers better results than what would be
achieved under current requirements, then we will work with you and
other interested parties to put those ideas to the test.”259 Parties inter-
ested in taking part in Project XL submit their proposal to the agency,
and attempt to demonstrate that the proposed alternative would in-
deed produce better results than the otherwise applicable require-
ments.
255. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995).
256. Id. at 27,283.
257. Id. at 27,282-83.
258. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: XL Community Pilot Program, 60 Fed.
Reg. 55,569 (Nov. 1, 1995). Although EPA still separates Project XL for communities (XLC),
the various components of Project XL all function in roughly the same manner. See EPA, What
is Project XLC?, at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file7.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
259. PROJECT XL: FROM PILOT TO PRACTICE 1 (Envtl. Protection Agency Office of Rein-
vention ed., 1999).
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To determine whether a proposed XL project should be used in
lieu of the normal regulatory regime, the EPA first “develops a quan-
titative baseline estimate of what would happen to the environment
without the project, and then . . . compares the anticipated results un-
der the project with that baseline.”260 A review group, consisting of
representatives from the EPA as well as state and tribal environ-
mental agencies,261 then scrutinizes the proposal. The review group
considers eight factors in determining whether the XL project’s envi-
ronmental performance will exceed the baseline and hence whether a
change in EPA’s rules is justified: 1) environmental results; 2) cost
savings and paperwork reduction; 3) stakeholder support;262 4) inno-
vation/multimedia pollution prevention; 5) transferability; 6) feasibil-
ity; 7) monitoring, reporting and evaluation; and 8) shifting of risk
burden.263
The most important of these factors is the first one, that the envi-
ronmental results must be superior to the results of compliance with
present and anticipated future regulation.264 Project XL defines better
results in the following manner: “‘Cleaner results’ can be achieved di-
rectly through the environmental performance of the project or
through the reinvestment of the cost savings from the project in ac-
260. James Briggs, Comment, Ski Resorts and National Forests: Rethinking Forest Service
Management Practices for Recreational Use, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 108 (2000).
261. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 255, at 27,283; see also EPA,
Starting an XL Project, at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file3.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2003)
("Since most XL projects require state as well as federal regulatory flexibility, EPA works with
the state or tribal government to assess the merits of the proposal").
Non-federal regulatory agencies play a significant role in determining whether the agency
should accept a proposal. EPA ensures early involvement of these non-federal agencies by di-
recting project proponents to "coordinate with and gain the support of their state and tribal en-
vironmental agencies that have regulatory responsibility within the scope of the project" be-
cause the local agencies will participate either as "co-regulators" with the EPA or as
stakeholders. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 255, at 27,283. Similarly,
cumulative risk-based environmental standards would necessarily be federal, but implementa-
tion of those standards could involve state actors, particularly because risk disparities are con-
centrated in specific communities, such as Chester, Pennsylvania. For examples of federal regu-
latory standards that are implemented by state regulators, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
262. For the purposes of Project XL, "[s]takeholders may include communities near the
project, local or state governments, businesses, environmental and other public interest groups,
or other similar entities." Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 255, at 27,287.
263. Id.; see also EPA, What is Project XL?, at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last
updated April 25, 2002) (noting that Project XLC has additional criteria).
In addition, the EPA requires that entities who wish to participate in Project XL meet a
"good actor" requirement. Briggs, supra note 260, at 109. Through the "good actor" require-
ment, the EPA "seeks to choose leaders of a given industry, while closely scrutinizing facilities
subject to ongoing enforcement actions or that have a history of environmental violations." Id.
264. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, supra note 255, at 27,287.
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tivities that produce greater environmental results. Explicit defini-
tions and measures of ‘cleaner results’ should be included in the proj-
ect agreement negotiated among stakeholders.”265 EPA acknowledges
that these comparisons require estimation and uncertainty.266
If the EPA agrees that the party’s proposed alternative is supe-
rior to the otherwise applicable regulations, the agency enters into an
agreement with that party formalizing the proposed alternative. That
agreement “becomes the new set of environmental standards under
which the designated company operates.”267 The company thereafter
need only comply with the terms of its agreement with the EPA, and
not with environmental requirements that would otherwise regulate
the areas covered by the agreement.
It is true that a great amount of criticism has been leveled at
Project XL. James Briggs summarizes the criticism:
Critics point to a weakening of monitoring and reporting require-
ments and a shift away from uniform national standards as detri-
mental to environmental protection. A shift to more individual, or
site-specific agreements between entities and permitting agencies
could create the risk of weakening the public’s ability to challenge
industry, thereby producing inconsistencies, and opening the door
for “sweetheart” deals. Another source of controversy concerns en-
forcement of project terms. EPA itself anticipates that, even though
265. Id.
266. Id. at 27,286.
In 1999, EPA announced new guidance for the project development process. Notice of Pro-
cess Improvements Under Project XL, 64 Fed. Reg. 16,450 (April 5, 1999). The new guidance
did not alter the basic structure of Project XL. See EPA, What is Project XL?, at
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (listing the current selection
criteria, which are almost identical to the criteria outlined in 1995). Instead the new guidance
incorporated the "lessons learned" since the beginning of Project XL. Notice of Process Im-
provements Under Project XL, supra, at 16,450. The primary effect of the new guidance was to
reduce transaction costs and speed up the project application process. Id. at 16,450-51. Though
the specific revisions are not important for the design of a risk-based regulatory structure, they
demonstrate that Project XL is "evolving" and that, from the EPA's perspective, a flexible
regulatory structure is viable even if more clarity, speed or predictability should later be pro-
vided.
Besides surviving one round of new guidance, the basic structure of Project XL also sur-
vived the change in administrations. Over two years after President Bush took office, Project
XL still utilizes the same eight selection criteria, led by the "superior environmental results"
requirement. The Bush administration's first EPA Administrator, Christine Whitman, specifi-
cally praised Project XL as a model "of how EPA should work with all environmental
stakeholders." Christine Whitman, Remarks at National Environmental Policy Institute (March
8, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/whitman_03_08_01.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2003).
267. Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Billingsley Potter, Environmental Audits: Barriers, Opportu-
nities and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENV. L. & POL'Y 233, 240 (1999).
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overall performance is expected to be superior, certain practices
may lead to non-compliance with certain regulations, such as the
Clean Air Act.268
Because of these potential problems, some environmental groups
have stated mockingly that “XL stands for ‘eXtra Leniency.’”269 Other
critics have argued that there are flaws in Project XL’s regulatory
structure. For example, Professor Steinzor argues that, because Proj-
ect XL employs “complex and ambiguous criteria,” it will be unable
“to remedy the most significant problems with the current system and
is unlikely to produce ‘cleaner, cheaper, smarter’ results.”270 Specifi-
cally, she contends that the current process of determining whether a
project achieves superior environmental results fails to function as a
“transparent set of unequivocal standards for judging the overall
merits of XL proposals.”271 Other critics argue that Project XL pro-
vides inadequate incentives for industry participation.272
The EPA disputes these criticisms. The agency argues, for exam-
ple, that firms that participate in Project XL are held to a “higher
standard of accountability for demonstrating negotiated results,” as
failure to meet the negotiated agreement would cause the EPA to
cancel the project and instead apply the normal regulations.273 Most of
the attacks on Project XL are specific to the manner in which that
program was implemented, and do not implicate the theory that
flexible regulation can increase efficiency and open the door to supe-
rior environmental results. Some of the criticisms directed at Project
XL are basically inapplicable to a cumulative risk-based regime. For
example, unlike Project XL, a cumulative risk-based standard is un-
likely to weaken either monitoring or reporting requirements: Indeed,
the reporting regime would probably be strengthened somewhat by
the EPA’s attempts to approximate cumulative risk levels. The
agency should pay keen attention to some of the other criticisms in
implementing a cumulative risk-based standard. For example, if non-
compliance has been a problem under Project XL, then the EPA
268. Briggs, supra note 260, at 111.
269. See Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 399, 451 (1998); Briggs, supra note 260, at 111.
270. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 139-40 (1998).
271. Id. at 130.
272. Professor Stewart argues that the "EPA has not been able to overcome the problem of
low industry participation," since "[o]nly a relatively few agreements have been concluded."
Stewart, supra note 9, at 67.
273. Briggs, supra note 260, at 112.
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should consider this in determining how much regulatory flexibility to
allow, and in determining whether to allow departures from permit
requirements. The agency would also do well to consider potential
problems in the determination of cumulative risk in order to ensure
that the cumulative risk-based regulation functions properly.274
2. HCPs
HCPs allow regulated entities to bypass specific statutory re-
quirements in exchange for taking action to overcome the harm of the
statutory violation. The authority for HCPs derives from § 10(a) of
the ESA.275 Under § 10(a), the Secretary of the Interior can permit
takings prohibited under § 9 of the Act if the taking is incidental to an
otherwise lawful activity.276 In order for the Secretary to permit such
takings, the party applying for permission must submit a HCP. The
HCP must specify: 1) the likely impact of the taking; 2) the measures
the applicant will use to “minimize and mitigate” the impact; 3) the
alternatives the applicant considered, and an explanation of why the
alternatives were not selected; and 4) other measures required by the
Secretary.277 A permit will issue and the HCP will be approved if: 1)
the taking is incidental; 2) the applicant minimizes and mitigates the
impact; 3) the applicant adequately funds the plan; 4) the taking will
not reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild; and 5) the other measures required by the Secretary are
met.278
274. For example, in her discussion of Project XL, Professor Steinzor suggests that the proc-
ess of comparing regulatory results to a baseline may be "difficult, even impossible" if monitor-
ing data is not adequate. Steinzor, supra note 270, at 132. For a discussion of how current prob-
lems with risk-related data could be remedied, see supra notes 246-249 and accompanying text.
Professor Steinzor also suggests that this inadequacy of data makes Project XL's reliance
on cross-media trades "dangerous." Steinzor, supra note 270, at 137. Cross-media regulation
requires "the evaluation of complex tradeoffs between emissions that are regulated versus those
that are not and the environmental benefits of regulation versus the environmental benefits
provided by unregulated activities." Id. at 136. A risk-based regulatory regime would directly
confront and presumably improve upon this evaluation. However, Professor Steinzor's concern
that site-specific evaluations "will miss the synergistic, cumulative effects of pollution at the re-
gional and national levels," is relevant both to the compilation and use of data in a risk-oriented
regime and also to determining how flexible to make the risk-based regulation. Id. at 138.
275. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
276. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
277. Id. § 1539(a)(2). The statute also specifies that the permit will include necessary re-
porting requirements.
278. Id.
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The Department of the Interior delegated implementation of
HCPs to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).279 Permit applications
to FWS must comply with statutory requirements, and must describe
both the activity that may cause the incidental taking and the species
covered by the permit.280 A number of factors influence the duration
of a permit, but the duration must be “sufficient to provide adequate
assurances to the permittee to commit funding necessary for the ac-
tivities authorized by the permit, including conservation activities and
land use restrictions.”281
Crucial to the increased popularity of HCPs in the 1990s was the
“no surprises” policy, which provides assurance that if permittees
comply with the terms of the HCP, they will not be required “to un-
dertake any further mitigation measures deemed necessary in the fu-
ture, even when ‘unforeseen circumstances’ arise.”282 This policy
would, for example, prevent the FWS from “imposing further mitiga-
tion measures in the future due to . . . a determination that a species’
habitat needs are greater than previously thought or migration of a
previously absent listed species onto the landowner’s property.”283
Under this policy, in the case of changed (but foreseen) circum-
stances, a permittee must implement mitigation measures agreed to in
the conservation plan, but FWS cannot require additional measures
not provided in the plan unless the permittee consents.284 In the case
of unforeseen circumstances, FWS can require additional measures
“only if such measures are limited to modifications within conserved
habitat areas, if any, or to the conservation plan’s operating conserva-
tion program for the affected species, and maintain the original terms
of the conservation plan to the maximum extent possible.”285 Even in
unforeseen circumstances, FWS cannot require additional measures
that involve the commitment of land, water, or money—or restric-
tions upon their use—without the permittee’s consent.286 One com-
mentator described the “no surprises” policy as “the single most im-
279. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2003).
280. Id. § 17.22(b).
281. Id. § 17.22(b)(4).
282. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Frame-
work for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 60 n.155 (2002); see 50 C.F.R. §
17.22 (2003).
283. Hsu, supra note 282, at 60 n.155.
284. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5) (2003).
285. Id. FWS will determine whether circumstances qualify as unforeseen based on factors
that relate to the situation of the species. Id.
286. Id.
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portant catalyst in stimulating renewed interest in Habitat Conserva-
tion Planning.”287
HCPs rely on the same basic logic as Project XL: Environmental
results are more important than (and do not always coincide with)
statutory requirements. Also like Project XL, HCPs tailor regulatory
enforcement to specific circumstances, rather than relying on uniform
requirements. This tailoring is performed within the broad constraint
of achieving superior results. A flexible risk-based layer of regulation
would utilize the same theory of regulatory flexibility to accomplish
new goals.
Although HCPs rely on the same basic logic as Project XL, HCPs
differ from Project XL in their approach to identifying the environ-
mental baseline. Project XL compares projects to a baseline that ref-
erences the results anticipated by compliance with present regulation,
and confronts the fact that the results of complying with existing
regulations are not always environmentally superior. In contrast,
HCPs address enforcement difficulties, implicitly recognizing that § 9
is incapable of perfect enforcement: “A driving concern during the
development of the [‘no surprises’] policy was the absence of ade-
quate incentives for non-Federal landowners to factor endangered
species conservation into their day-to-day land management activi-
ties.”288 The underlying assumption of HCPs is that using an exception
to the § 9 takings prohibition as an incentive will protect species bet-
ter than attempting to maximize enforcement.289
HCPs are more widespread than XL pilot projects, and apply at a
narrower level. While only 48 XL projects are in the implementation
phase, there are more than 500 HCPs.290 HCPs deal with a more fo-
cused background of regulation than Project XL. They only deal a
single section of one environmental statute, while Project XL spans
the entire regulatory regime.
287. Donald J. Barry, Opportunity in the Face of Danger: The Pragmatic Development of
Habitat Conservation Plans, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 129, 130 (1998).
288. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860
(Feb. 23, 1998).
289. A risk-based environmental standard would incorporate both conceptions of the base-
line. Achieving a desired level of risk requires solutions that overcome both gaps between ex-
isting statutory requirements and the desired amount of risk and also enforcement gaps.
290. See EPA, Implementation and Evaluation, at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/
implemen.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (listing forty-six Project XL projects in the
implementation phase); FWS, Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning, at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) ("As of Oct. 9, 2003, 407
Habitat Conservation Plans have been approved, covering approximately 38 million acres and
protecting more than 526 species.").
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The criticism of HCPs is very similar to the criticism directed at
Project XL. Critics’ primary argument is that the growth in HCPs
weakens the ESA.291 Critics have also argued that HCPs provide no
opportunity for “meaningful public participation,”292 and that the
HCP program is flawed because it lacks uniform standards.293 Like the
criticism of Project XL, most of the attacks on HCPs are specific to
the manner in which they are implemented, and do not implicate
regulatory flexibility in general. However, also like the criticism of
Project XL, the agency should pay attention to the critics of HCPs in
determining how flexible to make its cumulative risk-based regula-
tion.
Both Project XL and the FWS’s expanded use of HCPs demon-
strate the viability of incorporating reinvention-style flexibility into a
layer of risk-based environmental regulation. Even the critics of Proj-
ect XL and HCPs acknowledge the trend toward reinvention and
regulatory flexibility. The trend toward flexibility in regulatory efforts
could be applied to regulation of cumulative environmental risks, and
could help to minimize the costs of such regulation.
CONCLUSION
Even if the rights-based justification is seen as a compelling rea-
son for federal intervention, the regulatory system is both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive with respect to the justification: Federal
regulations apply even in areas where aggregate pollution levels are
low enough that citizens’ environmental rights are not violated, yet
the regulatory system does not guarantee any minimal level of envi-
291. See Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of
the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 281 (1998) ("In its rush to mollify eco-
nomic interests, however, the Interior Department has angered a significant portion of the envi-
ronmental community which sees some of the new policies as an illegal sell-out of imperiled
wildlife."); see also Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conservation Planning
Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,592 (1999) (arguing that, by giving into
opponents of the ESA, HCPs set a precedent that "invites further intimidation"); Hsu, supra
note 282, at 34 (applying a "simple economic game-theoretic model to analyze the relationship
between the increasing discontent with federal regulation and the increasingly conciliatory atti-
tudes of the federal regulators").
292. Stewart, supra note 9, at 67 ("Practical barriers to meaningful public participation, in-
cluding especially resource limitations, have become one of the most controversial aspects of
Project XL."); see also Graham M. Lyons, Habitat Conservation Plans: Restoring the Promise of
Conservation, 23 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 83, 84 (1999) (arguing that HCPs lack "op-
portunity for public review and enforcement").
293. Lyons, supra note 292, at 84.
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ronmental quality. If the justification is valid,294 then—because of the
awkward fit between the justification and the regulatory system—it
does not provide a compelling case for the present regulatory system:
Rather, it supports flexible, cost-effective direct regulation of the cu-
mulative levels of environmental risk to which citizens and communi-
ties can be exposed. Such flexible and cost-minimizing regulation of
cumulative environmental risks is consistent with the European
Community’s principle of proportionality in environmental protec-
tion, as it is the least restrictive possible measure for guaranteeing
citizens’ environmental rights, and is neither disproportionate nor ex-
cessive in relation to the regulatory goal.
294. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
